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INTRODUCTION 
Despite disagreement about the ultimate causes of the financial 
crisis of 2008, observers agree that inflated credit ratings assigned to the 
complex structured finance securities known as collateralized debt 
obligations or “CDOs” were a central cause of the crisis and the severe 
recession that followed.1 Among the causes identified are a worldwide 
savings glut, the increase in systemic risk resulting from the growth of 
the largely unregulated shadow banking system, abnormally low interest 
rates in the wake of the 2001-2002 recession, the inability of Americans 
to afford homes in an environment of stagnant wages and rising real 
estate prices, subprime mortgages and the proliferation of CDOs, credit 
default swaps (“CDSs”) and other new financial instruments. CDOs 
occupy a central place on this list, because they were the channel 
through which a flood of investment capital inflated the American 
housing market, thereby linking many of the other causes together.2 
Unfortunately for investors, homeowners and taxpayers the complexity 
inherent in the typical CDO gave rise to massive informational failures 
that remained hidden while the real estate market continued its rise. 
These failures manifested themselves primarily in the investment grade 
ratings the majority of CDO securities received. After the U.S. real 
estate market peaked in 2006, CDO securities suffered unprecedented 
ratings downgrades in 2007 and 2008, ushering in the credit crisis of 
2008 and the ensuing recession.3 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 
(2011) [hereinafter the “FCIC REPORT”] (typifying the disagreement over the ultimate 
causes of the financial crisis, see the majority report and dissents. The report by the 
majority focuses on misdeeds and failures at the Wall Street investment banks and the 
CRAs, while the minority dissent focuses on a global credit bubble, among other 
causes; a second dissent focuses on government housing policy). 
 2. See generally Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit 
Crunch 2007-2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSPS. 77, 98 (2009) (concluding that “[w]hat is new 
about this crisis is the extent of securitization, which led to an opaque web of 
interconnected obligations.”); GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE 
PANIC OF 2007 61-113 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010) [hereinafter GORTON, SLAPPED BY 
THE INVISIBLE HAND]. 
 3. See Emphraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, The Credit Rating Crisis 
(NBER Working Paper No. 15045), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w150 
45.pdf (Table 2: Structured Finance Upgrades and Downgrades; Table 5: Asset Types 
with Most Downgrades). 
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A central objective therefore of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”)4 is to 
prevent the credit rating agencies (“CRAs”) from issuing such 
inaccurate ratings in the future. To accomplish this, Subtitle C of Title 
IX of the Dodd-Frank Act, “Improvements to the Regulation of Credit 
Ratings Agencies” (“IRCRA”), extends the traditional American 
securities law strategy of mandatory information disclosure to the credit 
ratings process and institutes corporate governance rules meant to curb 
the influence of conflicts of interest.  It also exposes the CRAs to 
standards of liability similar, though not identical, to those other experts 
who opine on securities offerings face, and begins the process of 
eliminating the NRSRO (Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings 
Organization) designation from federal law.  
What IRCRA does not do is attack directly the root cause of ratings 
failure: the flawed quantitative models used by the CRAs to generate 
ratings for CDOs and other structured finance securities. Conflicts of 
interest and skewed incentives generated by the NRSRO designation 
were important causes of the ratings crisis, but I argue that both were 
secondary to the ratings models themselves. These models had the 
unusual effect of altering over time the very risk profile they were 
attempting to measure. By awarding investment grade ratings in a 
manner that was plausible when they were first implemented, during the 
period 2000-2003,5 the ratings models played an essential role in 
attracting massive amounts of investment to the CDO sector. They were 
thereby instrumental in inflating prices in the housing market to 
unsustainable levels, and in turn exposing the very real estate-backed 
CDOs they were rating to massive systemic risk that they failed to 
capture. 
This article analyses IRCRA in terms of the specific informational 
failures latent within CDOs and the ratings models. Its goal is to explain 
how and why flawed ratings were given, and how IRCRA attempts to 
prevent similar failures in the future. To accomplish this, Part I begins 
with a look at the development of the structured finance industry and the 
                                                                                                                                         
 4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter the “Dodd-Frank Act”]. 
 5. See Felix Salmon, Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street, 
WIRED MAGAZINE, Feb. 23, 2009, available at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/mag 
azine/17-03/wp_quant?currentPage=all [hereinafter Salmon, Recipe for Disaster]. 
While David X. Li’s formula provided a plausible means to measure risk, it came with 
limitations recognized by Li and others, which were generally ignored. 
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real estate boom in the United States. Part I then examines the pooling 
and tranching structure that is the hallmark of the CDO, as well as the 
typical method used to assign a credit rating to the various tranched 
securities issued by a CDO and the flaws with this approach; in 
particular it argues that technical flaws in the quantitative models were 
the primary cause of ratings failure in structured finance, and that 
conflicts of interest and regulatory incentives were important but 
secondary causes. The investment banks sponsoring CDO transactions, 
and by extension, the CRAs themselves, acted opportunistically when 
they took advantage of the various opportunities the flawed models 
offered them as insiders, but the models were already at work creating 
massive systemic risk before widespread intentional abuses occurred. 
Part II turns to IRCRA and presents a comprehensive overview of its 
provisions in light of the informational failures discussed in Part I. The 
Article concludes by considering how IRCRA responds to the specific 
problems discussed in Part I, and the possible significance of its indirect 
approach to quantitative failure. 
 
I. INFORMATIONAL FLAWS INHERENT IN 
COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS 
 
The credit crisis began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008. Lehman’s collapse followed significant downgrades of 
complex securities tied to the real estate market during the course of the 
previous year and speculation as to the effect on the investment banks of 
the loss in value of these securities.6 While the credit crisis specifically 
refers to the reluctance of lending institutions to lend, and the near 
seizure in the financial markets that resulted in late 2008, it was brought 
on by the inability of major financial institutions to obtain short-term 
cash funding in the overnight repurchase or ‘repo’ markets by pledging 
                                                                                                                                         
 6. On 2007 ratings downgrades, see Aaron Luchetti & Serena Ng, Get Set for a 
Wave of Debt Downgrades; With Investors Frazzled, Real Estate Softening, Three 
Ratings Firms Have Their Markers Out, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2007, at C1. For 
discussions at the time of possible effects of downgrades on the investment banks, see 
Chris Dammers, Silent Billions of Super-Senior CDOs Emerge to Torture Banks, 
EUROWEEK, Nov. 9, 2007, available at 2007 WL 28097315; Paul J. Davies & Michael 
Mackenzie, Correlation Crisis Could Leave Banks the Biggest Losers, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 
15, 2008, at 23; Gillian Tett, Banks’ Mortgage Writeoffs to Hit $60 Billion, FIN. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 2007, at 16. 
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their long-term securities as collateral for short-term loans.7 Because the 
banks could not obtain the cash necessary for their operations, their 
ability to operate was threatened and Lehman Brothers was forced into 
bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. While some economists specializing 
in financial markets maintain that the ultimate causes of this loss of 
confidence in the banks are complex and still uncertain,8 it is generally 
agreed that the uncertainty concerning the value of the real estate-
backed CDO securities held on the balance sheets of the major banks 
and other financial institutions was the major factor in this loss of 
confidence.9 
A. THE HOUSING BUBBLE AND THE RISE OF STRUCTURED FINANCE 
The economic history of the past decade is dominated by the twin 
phenomena of a real estate bubble in the United States and other 
developed countries and the financialization of the American economy. 
In the United States, the average home price increased over 80% in 
value from 2000 to 2006 and the share of total corporate profits 
attributable to the financial industry in the period 2000 to 2003 
increased from 29% to 42%, before sinking back to 28% in 2006.10 The 
                                                                                                                                         
 7. See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 2, at 128-35; 
Brunnermeier, supra note 2, at 80. 
 8. See Binymin Appelbaum & Sewell Chan, Senate Financial Bill Misguided, 
Some Academics Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, at A16; see generally Peter Yeoh, 
Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: Learning from Competing Insights, 7(1) INT’L J. 
DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 42 (providing an overview of competing perspectives on 
the financial crisis). 
 9. See, e.g., René M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, 24  J. 
ECON. PERSPS. 73, 83 (2010) (arguing that the direct cause of the collapse of Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers was that market participants “believed that there was a 
high probability that the assets of these institutions were worth less than their 
liabilities.”); GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 2, at 112 
(“[s]ecuritized bonds provided collateral for repo, and the shadow banking system 
worked. But once subprime risk infected the system, the vulnerability to panic was 
increased.”). 
 10. Home price data based on the Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index, 
available at www.standardandpoors.com/spf/docs/case-shiller/csnational_values 
_052506.xls (last visited June 7, 2011). The Case-Shiller National Value Index is based 
on a survey of 20 leading metropolitan regions in the U.S. Data on corporate profits are 
contained in THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, 2011, Table B-91 (“Corporate 
profits by industry, 1962-2010”). See also the FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 64-66 
(Financial Sector Growth: “I Think We Overdid Finance Versus the Real Economy.”). 
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housing bubble and the financialization of the economy were 
intertwined through the development of the structured finance industry, 
which constructed the CDO securities that served as the conduit for the 
capital fueling the real estate bubble. 
In tandem with the rise in real estate prices and the financialization 
of the U.S. economy, came spectacular growth in the sophisticated 
financial products developed on Wall Street over the past 25 years. In 
the same period of 2000 to 2006, the Securities and Financial Markets 
Association (“SIFMA”) reports that total mortgage-backed securities 
(“MBS”) issuance rose from $685.0 billion to $2.15 trillion, asset-
backed securities (“ABS”) issuance (not including MBSs or CDOs) 
increased from $281.05 billion to $753.87 billion, and global CDO 
issuance rose from $67.99 billion to $520.64 billion.11 Markets in 
derivatives also mushroomed, with the notional amount of CDSs 
outstanding increasing from $918.87 billion in 2001 to $34.42 trillion in 
2006, and then to $62.17 trillion in 2007.12 The major Wall Street banks 
led the way in developing complex securities tied to real estate, but all 
major financial players were involved, including hedge funds, 
institutional investors and the credit rating agencies, as well as the 
legislators and regulators whose decisions allowed these markets to 
develop outside the more tightly regulated public securities markets in 
                                                                                                                                         
 11. As reported by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(“SIFMA”), available at http://www.sifma.org/research (last visited Mar. 31, 2012). 
Mortgage-backed securities (“MBSs”) include both commercial and residential 
securities. Asset-backed securities (“ABSs”) include first-tier structured finance 
securities backed by home equity loans, subprime mortgages (but not real estate assets 
covered under other SIFMA categories such as MBSs), consumer receivables such as 
auto loans and credit card receivables. Collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) denote 
second-tier securities that securitize other securities, such as corporate bonds, various 
types of ABSs and CDOs. 
 12. ISDA Market Survey: Notional Amounts Outstanding at Year-End, All 
Surveyed Contracts, 1987-present, INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., (2010), 
available at www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-Market-Survey-annual-data.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2012); see generally Stulz, supra note 9, at 78-79 (“The Size of the 
Credit Default Swap Market”). It should be remembered that while amounts in the 
trillions of dollars sound alarming, they are notional amounts signifying the value of the 
reference obligation covered by a credit default swap (“CDS”), not the value to the 
parties of the insurance contract itself. A CDS contract obligating the seller to cover 
default on $100 million worth of bonds may cost the buyer 160 basis points, or $1.6 
million, per year. The notional value of this contract is $100 million, though it yields 
only $1.6 million to the seller and for most categories of bonds the risk of total loss of 
the underlying reference obligation is quite small. 
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the first place. “Structured finance,” which in a broad sense refers to all 
financial activities more complex than the traditional activities of 
underwriting single-issuer securities and engaging in lending activities, 
came to dominate Wall Street, displacing traditional lines of business 
such as advising corporate clients on mergers and acquisitions and 
underwriting “plain vanilla” securities transactions such as IPOs and 
issuances of corporate stock and debt.13 
The most important development in finance of the past decade was 
the CDO.14 Both CDOs and ABSs are securitization structures that 
combine a large amount of financial assets, such as mortgages, credit 
card receivables, corporate loans, debt securities or other fixed income 
assets into an asset or collateral pool, and then issue debt securities (and 
for tax purposes, a small amount of equity) paying interest and principle 
                                                                                                                                         
 13. See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, 50-51 (stating that Goldman Sachs 
estimates that 25%-35% of its revenues in the 2006-2009 period came from derivative 
operations). 
 14. This Article uses the term “ABS” to refer to a first-tier structured finance 
security that holds assets other than securities themselves in its asset pool, typically 
mortgages, consumer loan, credit card receivables and other types of non-securitized 
fixed-income assets. “CDO” on the other hand is used here in its narrow sense to refer 
only to a second-tier debt security that holds securities (such as first-tier ABS) in its 
asset pool. (The term “CDO” is sometimes used in a broader sense to refer to all 
tranched securitization structures backed by fixed-income assets, so that all ABSs 
would be referred to as “CDOs.”) Within the narrower category, ABS CDOs are CDOs 
holding bonds backed by RMBSs (residential mortgage-backed securities) and CMBSs 
(commercial mortgage-backed securities) or other first-tier asset backed securities. The 
typical ABS CDO held hundreds of various RMBS debt securities in their asset pools, 
though they were also constructed with asset pools consisting of CMBSs, CLOs 
(collateralized loan obligations) and ABSs built on credit card receivables, auto loans, 
student loans and many other fixed income obligations. As the structured finance 
industry developed in the period of 2003-2005, CDOs began to use CDO securities 
themselves in their asset pools, particularly the mezzanine tranches that were difficult to 
sell, resulting in “CDOs squared” or “CDO2s.” In turn, CDOs squared were placed in 
CDOs, leading to “CDOs cubed” or “CDO3s.” “Synthetic CDOs,” which are very 
important to the final stage of structured finance before the crash, were developed when 
a shortage of RMBS securities in 2005 led to the substitution of payments from credit 
default swaps for the interest payments from securities backed by real assets that would 
mimic the performance of the RMBS used as reference assets. See Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 373, 376 (2008) (categorizing structured finance securities as MBSs, 
ABSs and CDOs). 
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funded by the underlying assets in the asset pool.15 The debt securities 
are divided into layers or tranches, with the less risky, higher tranches in 
the capital structure receiving the first payments under the CDO’s 
“waterfall” provisions that govern the priority and amounts of payments 
on the different tranches.16 
CDO issuance exploded, and many variations on the basic model 
were introduced from 2000 to 2007. Crucial to the widespread 
acceptance of CDOs by bankers and investors was the publication in 
2000 of the Guassian copula formula developed by David X. Li, a 
mathematician who worked at the Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce and JPMorgan Chase.17 Although the formula was used in a 
simplistic and ultimately dangerous manner, the fact that it produced a 
single number indicating the correlation of risks in the CDO assets made 
it very useful for pricing CDO securities, and was central to their 
widespread acceptance.18 CDOs and ABSs were not new, however. 
Earlier forms of mortgage-backed securities were issued in the 1880s 
and the 1920s,19 and Lewis Ranieri at Salomon Brothers pioneered their 
contemporary incarnation by bundling mortgages together to make 
ABSs in the late 1970s and early 1980s.20 Then in 1987 the first CDO 
was issued by Drexel Burnham Lambert.21 Before its collapse in 1990, 
                                                                                                                                         
 15. See Joshua Coval, Jakob Jurek & Erik Stafford, The Economics of Structured 
Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 15 (2009) [hereinafter Coval et al., The Economics of 
Structured Finance]. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See David X. Li, On Default Correlation: A Copula Function Approach, 9 J. 
FIXED INCOME 43, 43 (2000) (introducing his Gaussian copula function for use in 
determining the correlation of default risks). 
 18. For the story of the introduction of the Gaussian copula function, see Salmon, 
Recipe for Disaster, supra note 5; see also Mark Whitehouse, Slices of Risk: How a 
Formula Ignited Market That Burned Some Big Investors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2005, 
at A1. 
 19. An earlier form of mortgage-backed security issued in the 1880s actually 
preceded the MBS of the 1970s. See Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive 
Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to 
Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1365-66 (2009). 
 20. See Mike McNamee, Lewis S. Ranieri: Your Mortgage Was His Bond, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 29, 2004; BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL 
THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 4-6 (Penguin 
Group, Inc. 2010). 
 21. Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COL. BUS. L. REV. 
137, 143 (1989); see Imperial Corp. Unit Sells Notes Backed By High-Yield Bonds, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1987, at 45; see also Ann Monroe, Agencies Will Broaden 
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Drexel’s C.E.O., Michael Milken, pioneered the high-yield or “junk 
bond” as a financing method for weak or otherwise financially 
distressed companies.22 Yielding rates that were substantially higher 
than the investment grade bonds issued by stronger companies, junk 
bonds were a means for troubled companies to obtain financing; on the 
buyer’s side, they were attractive to investors willing to gamble on a 
risky company in return for a significantly higher payout.23 Junk bonds 
met with an enthusiastic reception in the market, just as CDOs were to 
later, and rates of issuance were high.24 For the bonds Drexel and the 
other investment banks could not sell, however, federal banking 
regulations required them to commit substantial amounts of regulatory 
capital to cover the risk that remained on their balance sheets.25 
The CDO was an ingenious solution to the problem of the 
regulatory capital requirements: by placing the bonds in an asset pool 
owned by a “special purpose vehicle,” a trust or corporation legally 
separate from the investment bank sponsoring the transaction, they were 
taken off the bank’s balance sheet, thereby freeing up regulatory capital 
to engage in further profit-generating activities, such as underwriting 
more junk bonds. From the sponsor’s perspective, the CDO was a 
convenient solution to the constraint that banking regulations imposed 
on the lucrative but risky practice of junk bond finance. While the 
issuance of CDOs and ABSs also generated substantial fees for the 
investment banks, as investors paid a premium for debt securities 
tailored to their specific risk parameters, the original motive was as 
much regulatory as financial on the part of the sponsoring investment 
banks. This gave rise to what are known as “balance sheet” CDOs, 
CDOs issued for the purpose of improving bank balance sheets.26 
                                                                                                                                         
Triple-A Rating—It Will Go to Securities Backed By Junk Bonds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 
1987, at 41 (discussing concern about high ratings). 
 22. For an overview of the rise and fall of Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, see JAMES STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1992). 
 23. See William A. Klein, High-Yield Junk Bonds as Investments and as Financial 
Tools, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 505 (1997). 
 24. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services 
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 215, 231-233 (2002). 
 25. See Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating Industry, FED. RES. 
BOARD N.Y.Q. REV. 1, 6-7 (1994). 
 26. See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers (Univ. of San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper 
No. 07-46, 2006) at 73, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
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The explosive growth of structured finance was not driven solely 
by the interests of the investment banks, however.27 Because they 
offered relatively high returns, 28 ABSs and CDOs met with considerable 
investor demand. Since the great majority of securities by dollar value 
issued by CDOs and ABSs were investment grade, possessing ratings of 
BBB or higher on the Standard & Poor’s and Fitch ratings scales, and 
Baa on Moody’s, institutional investors and others who were restricted 
to holding debt securities with investment grade ratings could purchase 
them.29 Federal banking regulations had favored securities with high 
credit ratings since the early 1930s,30 and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the “SEC” or “Commission”) first introduced the 
“Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organization” (NRSRO) 
designation into federal securities law in 1975 with the broker-dealer net 
capital rule, Rule 15c3-1, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the “Exchange Act”).31 Rule 15c3-1 requires broker-dealers to take 
certain “haircuts” or reductions in value for debt securities they hold in 
calculating their required net capital; the ratings used must be issued by 
a NRSRO.32 The NRSRO designation has been adopted in many other 
areas of U.S. financial law, including in the Exchange Act, the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Employee Retirement Income 
                                                                                                                                         
_id=900257 [hereinafter Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like 
Other Gatekeepers]. 
 27. There are three principal explanations offered for the existence of tranched 
securities: transactions costs, market incompleteness and asymmetric information. See 
Peter M. DeMarzo, The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed 
Intermediation, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 2 (2005). As will be discussed in Part I.E below, 
economists and legal scholars have begun to question these conventional explanations. 
See, e.g., Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers, supra note 26. 
 28. See John Hull, The Credit Crunch of 2007: What Went Wrong? Why? What 
Lessons Can Be Learned?, 5 J. CREDIT RISK 3, 13 (2009). 
 29. See Cantor & Packer, supra note 25, at 5-7. 
 30. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs 
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 688-90 (1999). 
 31. Adoption of Uniform Net Capital Rule and an Alternative Net Capital 
Requirement for Certain Brokers and Dealers, 40 F.R. 29795 (July 16, 1975).  
 32. Net capital requirements for brokers or dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2011) 
(section (c)(2)(vi), “Securities Haircuts”); see also Partnoy, How and Why Credit 
Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, supra note 26, at 25. 
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Security Act (“ERISA”).33 While the intent of Congress was to 
incentivize, or in some cases require, institutional investors and others to 
hold less risky assets by instituting a legal barrier to investments in 
riskier or typically non-investment grade areas, such as consumer auto 
loans, non-securitized corporate loans, corporate junk bonds and 
residential mortgages, the NRSRO designation also granted a 
“regulatory license” to the established credit rating agencies.34 Finally, 
ABS and CDO securities also allowed investors to surmount a practical 
barrier, as investment in many asset classes would have been difficult or 
impossible. By pooling hundreds and thousands of relatively small 
assets, such as mortgages on individual homes or credit card receivables, 
under a single corporate umbrella, structured finance securities provided 
access to types of assets otherwise unavailable, or at least not easily 
available, to institutions not dealing in those types of assets on the retail 
level. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATION 
The collateralized debt obligation or CDO is a complex debt 
security that at bottom is based on a relatively straightforward “pooling 
and tranching” structure: a CDO holds a multititude of fixed-income 
securities in its asset pool and uses the proceeds to make interest and 
principal payments to investors on the various subordinated layers or 
‘tranches’ of its own debt securities.35 Instead of funding these payments 
with revenues from business activities and investment projects, as a 
traditional corporation does, the CDO pays its debtholders with the 
fixed-income payments it receives from its collateral.36 The tranches of 
debt securities consist of (supposedly) low-risk, investment-grade 
                                                                                                                                         
 33. See John Patrick Hunt, Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: 
The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 
2009 COL. BUS. L. REV. 109, 144-47 (2009). 
 34. See Partnoy, supra note 30, at 623. 
 35. See Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, supra note 15. 
 36. See Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How 
Misapplied Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt 
Obligation Market Disruptions 34-51 (Working Paper, May 14, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027475 [hereinafter Mason & Rosner, Where Did the Risk 
Go?] (contrasting the dynamic nature of traditional corporate bond issuers with the 
static nature of structured finance vehicles and the relevance of this distinction for the 
ratings process). 
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securities at the top of the capital structure, followed by a smaller 
amount of ‘mezzanine’ securities and finally a small equity cushion of 
usually 1-4% by value.37 While the internal mechanisms of the CDO can 
become very complex, especially the ‘waterfall’ structure that governs 
the order of payments to the various tranches, the hallmark of the CDO 
is this basic pooling and tranching structure. 
CDOs are formed when the sponsor sets up a special purpose entity 
or “SPE” (also sometimes referred to as a special purpose vehicle or 
“SPV”), typically in a tax-friendly jurisdiction such as the Cayman 
Islands, to serve as the legal issuer of the CDO securities. The issuer is 
legally independent of the sponsor for two main reasons: first, the assets 
in the collateral pool must be under the control of a separate legal entity 
for accounting purposes under banking regulations; as discussed above, 
regulatory motives were behind the development of the first CDOs.38 
Second, for the debt securities issued by the CDO to attain an 
investment grade rating, it is crucial that the asset pool be legally 
independent and therefore bankruptcy-remote from the sponsor.39 
Once the issuer is formed, the sponsor begins the process of 
transferring assets to it. Typically this occurs over time as the collateral 
manager fills the asset pool during a specified period.40 During this 
“ramp up” period, the collateral manager fills the collateral pool and 
then manages it under a collateral management agreement which gives 
the manager some leeway in determining the exact assets in the pool, 
although the agreement typically restricts the manager in terms of what 
assets can actually be placed in the asset pool.41 
                                                                                                                                         
 37. See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 2, at 97-101 
(providing an overview of the structure of typical CDOs containing subprime mortgage-
backed bonds). 
 38. See supra notes 25, 30-33 and accompanying text. 
 39. See generally Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The 
Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553 (2008) 
(providing a critical examination of the legal requirement of bankruptcy remoteness that 
is central to securitization). 
 40. See CDOs in Plain English: A Summer Intern’s Letter Home, NOMURA FIXED 
INCOME RESEARCH, (Sept. 13, 2004), http://www.vonodkothari.com/Nomura_cdo 
_plainenglish.pdf. 
 41. See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 2, at 97-98 (stating 
that the collateral manager “is allowed to trade—buy and sell—bonds to a limited 
extent (say 10% of the notional amount per year) over a limited period of time . . . .”); 
Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, The Alchemy of CDO Ratings, 56 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 617, 625-26 (2009). 
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After the CDO is formed, the sponsor sells the various tranches of 
debt securities to investors.42 An aggressive but not unrepresentative 
capital structure from the 2003-2006 period is that of the Broderick 
CDO 1 Ltd. transaction,43 arranged by Merrill Lynch in 2005: 
 
Class Value Rating Percentage 
A-1V $250,000,000 AAA 20% 
A-1NVA $354,750,000 AAA 29% 
A-1NVB $485,000,000 AAA 39% 
A-2 $85,000,000 AAA 7% 
B $43,000,000 AA 2% 
C $23,000,000 BBB 2% 
Preferred 
Shares 
$8,500,000 N/R 0.7% 
 
All the securities issued by Broderick CDO 1 Ltd. are investment 
grade. Such securities are highly desirable for fixed-income investors 
seeking safe investments that still possess an attractive yield. Even more 
important for institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual 
funds and others are the investment-grade ratings these securities 
possess, i.e., any rating BBB or higher on the Standard & Poor’s and 
Fitch scales, or Baa or higher on Moody’s, because of numerous 
provisions of U.S. banking, securities and other financial law.44 
Also crucial to the internal structure of the CDO is the method used 
to ensure that its tranches receive the desired credit ratings. For a rating 
agency to assign a particular rating to a given tranche, it must determine 
                                                                                                                                         
 42. See the FCIC Report, supra note 1, at 128. 
 43. See BRODERICK CDO 1 LTD. OFFERING CIRCULAR, http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2005-12-
00_Broderick%201_CDO%20Offering%20Circular.pdf. The Broderick CDO 1 Ltd. 
offering documents are included in the CDO documents available at 
http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/resource/staff-data-projects/cdo-Library. 
 44. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
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the likelihood of an interruption in payments of interest and principle on 
a given tranche in the event of default of a certain amount of assets in 
the asset pool.45 The mezzanine tranches will be the first to suffer 
default, with the lower-yielding but safer securities higher in the capital 
structure defaulting only in the event of a greater disruption of payments 
from the asset pool.46 The first and most common technique to ensure 
the safety of a given class of securities is “overcollateralization”: in 
building the capital structure, the sponsor provides a slightly greater 
amount of assets than is necessary under ordinary conditions.47 With 
overcollateralization, the additional assets function as insurance in the 
event of disruptions of the payment stream from the underlying assets. 
Assuming normal economic conditions, the ultimate beneficiaries of 
overcollateralization will be the holders of the small equity tranche, as 
they will receive a (relatively) generous payout upon the termination of 
the CDO. The second technique used to insure that the tranches receive 
their desired ratings is to purchase insurance on the underlying assets in 
the form of CDSs.48 In the event of default on the underlying mortgages, 
loans or other collateral, the CDSs will provide make-up payments to 
the SPE, allowing it to meet its scheduled payments to bond holders.49 
When the CRAs determine the ratings on a particular tranche of 
securities, the cushion a particular tranche has in the event of a 
                                                                                                                                         
 45. Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, supra note 15, at 8; see 
generally Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers, supra note 26, 73-80 for an overview of the ratings process for structured 
finance securities. 
 46. See Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers, supra note 26, at 74. 
 47. See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 2, at 84, 99; see 
also Michel G. Crouhy, Robert A. Jarrow & Stuart M. Turnbull, The Subprime Credit 
Crisis of ‘07 10 (Working Paper, July 9, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1112467 (discussing the difference between the income 
and expenses of the credit structure as “excess spread”). 
 48. See Kathleen C. Engle & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning A Blind Eye: Wall Street 
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2048 n.45 (2007). 
 49. See STANDARD & POOR’S STRUCTURED FINANCE CDO EVALUATOR VERSION 
3.0: TECHNICAL DOCUMENT [hereinafter S&P CDO EVALUATOR] (Section 6.6, 
Long/short CDS, discussing role of CDSs as insurance in CDOs); see also the FCIC 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 132, 140 (discussing role of AIG in providing insurance to the 
CDO industry in the form of CDSs through its Financial Products Group). 
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disruption of payments from the asset pool, either through 
overcollateralization or through CDSs, will be taken into account.50     
Pooling fixed income assets under a separate legal entity, tranching 
their payments and the provision of some cushion in the event of 
defaults within the collateral pool then are the basic structural elements 
of the CDO. The basic structure of the CDO, and the ABS in general, is 
relatively straightforward, despite the fact that CDOs as actually 
constructed can become incredibly complex. 
C. INFORMATIONAL FLAWS 
In practice, the complexity of CDOs offers numerous opportunities 
for informational failure. Most second-tier, ABS CDOs are 
collateralized by 100 to 500 separate securities, each one of which might 
contain between 2,000 and 10,000 individual financial obligations, in 
the form of home, car, commercial real estate or other loans.51 Proceeds 
from this collateral are then divided into anywhere from 3 or 4 to 10 or 
more tranches, with the payment scheme governed by a complex 
“waterfall” provision providing for payment to the more senior tranches 
first, with the subordinate tranches following.52 The assembly of a CDO 
requires the coordinated efforts of the sponsor, collateral seller, 
collateral manager, credit rating agency, CDS seller (if credit 
                                                                                                                                         
 50. See Engle & McCoy, supra note 48, at 2047-2048. 
 51. A typical CDO would have in the low hundreds of securities or other 
obligations. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES 
IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATION OF SELECT CREDIT RATING 
AGENCIES 7 (2008) [hereinafter SEC 2008 SUMMARY REPORT]; see also Partnoy, How 
and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, supra note 26, at 79 
(“a typical CDO squared transaction might involve 1,000 corporate names [, since] 
there are only about 400 liquid corporate names” each corporate name was, on average, 
listed 4.17 times in a CDO squared transaction). A first-tier ABS, on the other hand, 
would typically have thousands of individual mortgages or other financial obligations. 
See Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of 
Subprime Mortgage Credit, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO. 318 13 (2008) 
(analyzing a first-tier, $881 million ABS backed by 3,949 subprime loans put together 
by New Century Financial, the GSAMP Trust 2006-NC2); see also FCIC REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 71 (analyzing a Citigroup RMBS with 4,499 subprime mortgages 
originated by New Century Financial, the CMLTI 2006-NC2). 
 52. See Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, supra note 15; see also 
Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 41 tbl. 1, for an example of tranche structure and 
interest and principal waterfalls. 
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enhancement is provided through CDS or the CDO is synthetic) and the 
law firms representing the sponsor and the collateral manager.53 And 
finally the CDO securities are purchased by an investor who may or may 
not have the technical capability to make an independent assessment of 
the CDO and its assets, if such information is even available.54 In fact, 
due to the practical impossibility of investigating the underlying assets 
in a CDO, most investors appear instead to have relied on ratings 
provided by the CRAs.55 
The complexity of real-world CDOs led to three primary levels of 
informational failure: 1) At the level of the underlying assets in the 
collateral pool, the difficulty of ascertaining the creditworthiness of any 
one discrete asset; 2) at the level of the CDO as a whole, the difficulty of 
assessing the collective risk inherent in the collateral; and 3) the 
compounding of these two errors through the creation of second, third, 
and in some cases even fourth-tier structured finance securities. 
Compounding of error also propogated itself through the financial 
system through the significant use of CDSs priced according to flawed 
risk estimates.56 As a result of these multifaceted informational 
problems, the CDO market collapsed in the latter half of 2007 and 2008 
as investors lost faith in their ratings, particularly for those CDOs 
backed by real estate assets.57 While on a theoretical level CDOs can be 
seen as a mechanism to overcome the “lemons problem” that would 
otherwise obtain benefits in the market for investing in assets such as 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. See the FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 129-132. 
 54. John C. Coffee Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly 54 
(Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 359, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1650802 [hereinafter Coffee, 
Ratings Reform] (access to capital in industries such as housing finance “may depend 
on ratings that are credible, because ‘do-it-yourself’ financial analysis of opaque debt 
instruments is simply not feasible for most financial institutions.”). 
 55. See Mendales, supra note 19, at 1361 (“The key to the problem is that 
unregulated ratings for asset-backed securities became proxies for the full disclosure 
required by securities law.”); see also Charles W. Calomiris, Financial Innovation, 
Regulation, and Reform, 29 CATO J. 1, 72 (2009) (arguing that in fact buyers wanted 
CRAs to underestimate the risk inherent in complex securities because of the regulatory 
benefits granted by the ratings). 
 56. See Carrick Mollenkamp, Serena Ng, Liam Pleven & Randall Smith, Behind 
AIG’s Fall, Risk Models Failed to Pass Real-World Test, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2008, at 
A1. 
 57. See Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 3 (Table 5: Asset Types with Most 
Downgrades). 
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mortgages and consumer loans, it appears that the actual informational 
failures in many CDOs swamped whatever theoretical informational 
benefits they offered.58 CDOs therefore appear to have been “lemons in 
disguise,” so to speak, risky assets that were not recognized as such in 
the marketplace due to the difficulty, and perhaps even the impossibility, 
of actually ascertaining their true credit risk. 
1. Risky Collateral 
In the complex chain of relationships that comprises the mortgage-
backed CDO, the first link is the relationship between the borrower 
using a mortgage to purchase or refinance a home and the mortgage 
originator arranging her loan. Traditionally, in the United States this 
relationship had been between the homeowner and a local bank which 
held the mortgages it issued until maturity, making a small but safe 
return on its loans; whatever risk the bank assumed was balanced out by 
the value of the property mortgaged, and with a 20% required 
downpayment the risk of such loans was small.59 Over the past decade 
the originate-to-hold business model was displaced by mortgage brokers 
originating to distribute,60 at the same time that prices began to inflate 
and new types of mortgages such as adjustable rate mortages (“ARMs”) 
and interest-only mortgages (“IOs”) were developed in response to the 
affordability squeeze.  
Just as homebuyers found it difficult to properly evaluate the costs 
and risks these mortgages entailed, their complexity would have also 
made it difficult, had they wanted to do so, for the CDO sponsors who 
bought them to properly evaluate their creditworthiness as compared to 
a straightforward fixed-rate, prime mortgage. In any event, sponsors did 
not look too closely at the collateral going into residential mortgage-
backed securities (“RMBSs”) and, in turn, CDOs, as they were focused 
on the fee income they earned from the CDO business, and assumed that 
the supersenior tranches their institutions retained would in any event be 
safe as they sat at the very top of the tranched capital structures.61 
                                                                                                                                         
 58. See infra Part I.E.1. 
 59. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime 
Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1076. 
 60. See Richard J. Rosen, The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Lending, CHI. 
FED LETTER (Fed Res. Bank of Chi., Chi. Ill.), (Nov. 2007), http://www.chicagofed.org 
/digital_assets/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2007/cflnovember2007_244.pdf. 
 61. See the FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 129. 
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Nevertheless, subprime mortgages issued through 2005 performed fairly 
well, with only a small increase in defaults up to 2006.62 The 2006 
vintage of subprime loans however began to default soon after issuance, 
which was first noticed in early 2007 and provided the first signal of 
problems in the housing market.63 One reason for this is that flawed 
incentives in the originate-to-distribute mortgage origination model had 
by that time corrupted mortgage lending, leading to the first set of 
informational failures in the subprime chain. By 2006, as competition in 
the mortgage business reached a fever pitch, senior management of the 
mortgage brokers placed intense pressure on their sales forces to grow 
the volume of mortgages originated.64 In response, it appears that while 
the numerical factors such as FICO scores, loan-to-value ratios and 
other data reported to purchasers of mortgages on term sheets remained 
relatively constant, other items of information requested by brokers, 
such as length of time on the job and the time spent in the last residence, 
declined in quality. This information requested by lenders was not even 
shared with buyers of mortgages and investors further down the chain.65 
In addition to the probable decline in borrower quality reflected by such 
non-reported information is also the presence of a certain amount of 
outright mortgage fraud on the part of borrowers. In many such cases, 
this fraud was abetted by unscrupulous mortgage lenders who had no 
incentive to police against it, as they were paid on the basis of 
commissions on loan volume, not the ultimate soundness of such loans 
granted. For example, the SEC’s 2008 CRA Examination Report 
mentions that when one CRA began “Enhanced Originator/Issuer 
Reviews” for subprime transactions, it “conducted an internal review of 
45 loan files and reported that it found the appearance of fraud or 
                                                                                                                                         
 62. See Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis 1-2 (Dec. 5, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020396 
(Figure 1 illustrates the increased delinquency rates for mortgages issued in 2006 and 
2007; the authors also demonstrate that delinquency rates increased for all types of 
mortgages, not just low documentation ones, and that the decrease in housing price 
appreciation was a major factor associated with delinquency). 
 63. See Thomas Zimmerman, The Great Subprime Meltdown of 2007, 13 J. 
STRUCTURED FIN. 7, 12 (2007) (“loans from 2006 with the same characteristics [hybrid 
ARMs, simultaneous 2nd liens with 0% down and liar loans] are defaulting at about 
twice the rate as their 2005 cousins.”). 
 64. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 105. 
 65. See Zimmerman, supra note 63, at 12. 
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misrepresentation in almost every file.”66 Evidence of such fraud 
indicates that, at least at the height of the housing boom, the 
informational problems in MBSs and CDOs trace all the way back to the 
borrowers who took such loans. 
A second and more fundamental reason for the risky collateral put 
into late-vintage ABS CDOs has to do with the very nature of the 
mortgages that were developed during the housing boom. The subprime 
mortgages that predominated during the housing boom were sensitive to 
housing prices in a way that traditional fixed-rate mortgages are not; 
specifically, their economic viability required continuously rising home 
prices.67 Gary Gorton explains that the adjustable rate mortgage, with a 
‘teaser’ rate of 2 or 3 years, and then a reset to a higher floating rate, say 
LIBOR plus 6.00%, in effect forces borrowers to seek a refinancing at 
the end of the introductory period, in order to avoid the much higher 
payments that would otherwise result when the initial rate expires.68 In 
the event that house prices have risen, a lender would typically permit 
refinancing, either into a fixed rate loan or into another ARM, using 
some of the increase in the value of the underlying property as an equity 
cushion for the new loan.69 In this way, subprime mortgages in a 
housing market experiencing substantial price increases could 
conceivably enable borrowers to build up enough equity in their homes 
to make the mortgages ultimately beneficial, despite the relatively high 
costs in interest rates and fees. 
 However, as Gorton emphasizes,70 because the higher payments 
upon reset will be unaffordable for most borrowers, this implicitly gives 
the lender, and not the borrower, the option to continue to finance the 
purchase of the home or not. Unlike a fixed rate mortgage, where the 
borrower has the option to “call” the mortgage by prepaying or to “put” 
by defaulting, giving the property to the lender in effect, now the lender 
is given fundamental decision-making power over whether to continue 
                                                                                                                                         
 66. See SEC 2008 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 51, at 18 n.23; see generally 
James Charles Smith, The Structural Causes of Mortgage Fraud, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
473 (2010). 
 67. See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 2, at 74-82 
(“Subprime Mortgage Design”). “Subprime” is not an official designation or legal term; 
it merely denotes borrowers who are “perceived to be riskier than the average borrower 
because of a poor credit history.” Id. at 68. 
 68. Id. at 75. 
 69. Id. at 78-80. 
 70. Id. at 79. 
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financing the property. In Gorton’s words, “a subprime mortgage 
contains an implicit embedded option on house prices for the lender.”71 
If the increase in the property’s value is too small, or has even declined, 
a sufficient amount of equity will not have built up for the lender to feel 
comfortable extending the loan. In that event, the lender can repossess 
the property assuming the borrower is unable to make its payments upon 
reset. 
Looking at the course of events from 2006 to the present, as the 
housing market slowed and then crashed, it is clear that where there are 
price declines on the levels seen in the United States, the lender’s option 
in this situation does not in fact protect it. The costs of foreclosure are 
significant, combining the deterioration in property value of vacant 
homes with the effects of fire sale prices in auctions. The conclusion to 
be drawn is that a large measure of the risk in subprime collateral came 
from the intrinsic economic structure of the mortgage contracts, which 
were only viable if housing prices continued to increase as they had 
since the late 90s.72 Without such increases, borrowers could not 
refinance, and in an economic climate of widespread defaults and 
substantial price declines, the lender’s option to possess the property 
was not very valuable either. Indeed, by 2008 over eighty subprime 
lenders had either gone bankrupt or otherwise halted subprime mortgage 
lending activities.73 
2. Ratings Models 
After collateral is purchased by a CDO arranger, the process of 
constructing and rating a CDO begins. The quantitative ratings models 
were essential to the CDO business and by extension the credit crisis of 
2008-2009, and ratings reform is one of the central objectives of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 71. Id. at 76. 
 72. Id. at 81 (“To reiterate, no other consumer loan has the design feature in which 
the borrower’s ability to repay is so sensitively linked to appreciation of an underlying 
asset.”); see also Zimmerman, supra note 63, at 8-10 (describing how a “virtuous 
subprime cycle” lasting from 2000 to 2007 “camouflaged the performance of high risk 
loans”). 
 73. See Worth Civils & Mark Gongloff, Subprime Shakeout, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL ONLINE, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-
subprimeloans0706-sort.html. 
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Dodd-Frank Act.74 How were structured finance securities rated, and 
why did the ratings so utterly fail to capture the risk inherent in 
structured finance securities? 
The traditional business of the rating agencies involved rating the 
credit risk of debt obligations issued by corporations, municipalities and 
other business and governmental entities.75 Industrial corporations are 
dynamic institutions that function as individual actors in larger 
economic systems, and evaluating a company’s debt primarily involves 
an analysis of the expected cash flow of the firm’s underlying business 
and investment projects.76 In rating the debt security of a corporate 
issuer the rating agencies focus on the quality and experience of 
management personnel, the prospects for the overall sector of the 
economy the firm operates in and entity-specific factors such as the 
firm’s capital structure and existing financial condition. While issuers 
can appeal an assigned rating in the event of disagreement, the ratings 
process for traditional corporate debt is not interactive or iterative. The 
ratings agency reviews the entity after a debt issuance is planned, 
offering an independent assessment of the issuer towards the end of the 
capital-raising process.77 In a standard corporate or government bond 
issuance the rating agencies do not function as active participants, and 
there is no legal question of their being deemed “underwriters” of a 
securities issuance under federal securities law.78 In those instances 
where capital-raising institutions have pressed legal claims against the 
rating agencies in the context of conventional corporate or municipal 
bond issuances, the First Amendment provides a defense that their 
                                                                                                                                         
 74. See, e.g., Senate Banking Comm., Brief Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, SENATE.GOV, http://banking.senate.gov 
/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Fi
nal.pdf. 
 75. See generally Cantor & Packer, supra note 25. 
 76. Id. at 3; see also Mason & Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go?, supra note 36, at 
36-37. 
 77. See Cantor & Packer, supra note 25, at 5. 
 78. See Jennifer E. Bethel, Allen Ferrell & Gang Hu, Legal and Economic Issues in 
Litigation Arising From The 2007-2008 Credit Crisis 59 (Harv. L. Sch. Discussion 
Paper, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020396. 
Bethel et al. raise the issue of whether the CRAs could be considered “underwriters” for 
U.S. securities law purposes, exposing them to liability for their role in assisting with 
the structuring of complex securities, but conclude this is unlikely. Indeed, the courts 
have rejected such arguments. See infra Part II.C.1 for further discussion of the (non) 
issue of CRAs as underwriters. 
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ratings qualify as “the world’s shortest editorial” and government should 
not interfere, short of the demonstration of actual malice on the part of 
the agencies.79 
While structured finance ratings aim to capture the credit risk of the 
securities being issued, just as ratings of traditional debt securities do, 
and they use the same letter grades of AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, 
CC, DD, D (the scale used by S&P and Fitch), or Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, 
B, Caa, Ca, C, D (Moody’s), rating a structured finance security differs 
both in the degree of quantification involved and the process of working 
with the issuer.80 First, in structured finance there is no corporate entity 
attempting to execute a business plan.81 Instead, the SPV has an asset 
pool often concentrated in one segment of the economy, most famously 
residential real estate.82 The CDO is not a dynamic organization but a 
(relatively) static one—except to the extent a collateral manager has the 
mandate to buy and sell a certain amount of assets in the asset pool in a 
given time period, it merely receives payments from the assets it holds. 
Instead of evaluating the experience and past successes of management 
and the prospects for such a firm in the economy at large, rating a CDO 
involves the use of complex statistical ratings tools intended to gauge 
credit risk by taking into account numerous data fields relevant to its 
asset pool.83 Second, the CDO rating process is iterative, with sponsors 
knowing in advance the tools that will be used to rate their products, 
engaging in back-and-forth discussion with the particular analysts in 
charge of the rating, and having recourse to an appeals process in the 
                                                                                                                                         
 79. See infra Part II.C.1 for further discussion of the First Amendment protections 
offered to the CRAs. 
 80. See Mason & Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go?, supra note 36, at 36-48 on the 
contrast between rating structured finance securities and traditional corporate debt 
obligations; see note 84 infra on the back-and-forth nature of the structured finance 
ratings process. 
 81. See Mason & Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go?, supra note 36, at 36-37. 
 82. See Jian Hu, Assessing the Credit Risk of CDOs Backed By Structured Finance 
Securities Rating Analysts’ Challenges and Solutions 8 (Figure 5, “Distribution of 
Asset Types Backing Cash and Hybrid SF CDOs”) (Moody’s Investors Service, 2007), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1011184; see also the 
SIFMA breakdown of ABS categories at www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (last 
visited May 5, 2011), listing auto, credit cards, equipment, home equity, manufactured 
housing, other and student loans. 
 83. See S&P CDO EVALUATOR, supra note 49. 
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event the sponsor disagrees with the conclusions of the analyst and 
rating committee at the agency.84 
The process begins with the CDO sponsor presenting the details of 
the proposed deal to the CRA, including the particular assets to be held 
in the asset pool, the proposed capital structure and the ratings sought 
for the various tranches. Sponsors have access to the quantitative tools 
developed by the rating agencies—S&P’s “CDO Evaluator,” Moody’s 
“CDOROM,” and Fitch’s “VECTOR”—and even run the quantitative 
computer simulations themselves that are designed to calculate the 
probability of losses and to justify a given rating for a tranche.85 After 
the calculations are run the sponsor presents the rating agency with the 
audited results.86 The CRA focuses on the quantitative information the 
sponsor provides, as well as qualitative factors such as the reputation 
and track record of the collateral manager the sponsor intends to use and 
the legal structures reflected in the draft CDO documentation.87 In the 
course of the ratings process, the rating analysts engage in a 
collaborative process with their client to structure an asset pool that 
meets the sought-after ratings at the lowest possible cost to the 
sponsor.88 After a deal structure, asset pool and ratings are decided upon, 
                                                                                                                                         
 84. Despite protestations on the part of the CRAs downplaying the interactive 
nature of the ratings process (see, e.g., Hu, supra note 82, at 10, n.17 (“Contrary to 
some misconceptions, Moody’s rating analysts are not involved in the structuring and 
pricing of CDO transactions. In addition, it is natural that rating analysts and arrangers 
need to have dialogues as arrangers make changes to satisfy investors and present these 
changes to rating analysts for review.”)), it is clear that issuing a structured finance 
rating involved, at the minimum, extensive back-and-forth communications and 
negotiations between the parties. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON 
GLOBAL FIN. SYS., THE ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE: ISSUES AND 
IMPLICATIONS 2 (2005); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mortgage Meltdown and Gatekeeper 
Failure, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 20, 2007, at 5; Aaron Lucchetti, Rating Game: As Housing 
Boomed, Moody’s Opened Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2008, at A1 (quoting former 
Moody’s executive Paul Stevenson as saying “that the rating process became a 
negotiation.”); Mason & Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go?, supra note 36, at 13. 
 85. See Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers, supra note 26, at 79 n.62, citing STANDARD & POOR’S, STRUCTURED 
FINANCE, S&P GLOBAL CASH FLOW AND SYNTHETIC CDO CRITERIA, Mar. 21, 2002. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Hu, supra note 82, at 10-11. 
 88. See Roger Lowenstein, Triple A Failure, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 27, 
2008, at 36; see also Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 41, at 632-33. Benmelech & 
Dlugosz point out that S&P’s CDO Evaluator software allowed sponsors to calculate 
the minimal amount of collateral required to support a particular credit rating for a 
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the analyst at the CRA presents the entire transaction to the ratings 
committee at the agency for sign-off. If the sponsor disagrees with the 
final determination of the ratings committee, it may appeal the 
committee’s rating if it believes it does not reflect the CDO’s actual 
creditworthiness.89 
The mathematical rating models are the key to the ratings process. 
While they differ in their particulars, the three major CRAs all follow 
the same basic two-step approach.90 First, a loss distribution for the 
underlying asset pool is determined, and second, cash-flow simulations 
are run using the loss distribution to estimate whether the securities in 
the proposed capital structure, with its payment waterfalls and other 
financial details, merit the ratings sought.91 Estimation of the loss 
distribution involves an analysis of the assets in the collateral pool, such 
as mortgage or other asset-backed securities, corporate loans, etc. and 
assigning default probabilities to them using historical or other data 
relevant to their performance. A key assumption in the first step of the 
ratings process concerns the correlation rate, that is, the likelihood that 
one asset will default in the event that another does so. For example, if 
one corporate debt security defaults, S&P’s CDO Evaluator assumes 
that another corporate debt security issued by a company in the same 
sector will have a 15% chance of defaulting, but the likelihood that 
another corporate security by an issuer exists in a different sector is 
assumed to be only 5%.92 Many observers believe that a key factor in the 
                                                                                                                                         
tranche, and that S&P’s CDO Evaluator Handbook Version 3.0 (2006) stated that 
S&P’s Excess Collateral field “tells what percentage of asset notional needs to be 
eliminated (added) in order for the transaction to provide just enough (i.e. ROC equals 
100%) support at a given rating level.” Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 41, at 632 
(Figure 7, reproducing page from S&P’s CDO Evaluator Handbook, Version 3.0 
(2006)). The authors also argue that the remarkable structural uniformity of the 744 
cash-flow CLOs they analyze indicates that sponsors most likely learned that particular 
combinations of tranches and ratings provided the highest ratings at the lowest possible 
cost. See Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 41, at 618. 
 89. See SEC 2008 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 51, at 9. 
 90. For a discussion of ratings methods in general, see generally Ingo Fender & 
John Kiff, CDO Rating Methodology: Some Thoughts on Model Risk and Its 
Implications (Bank for International Settlements, Working Paper No. 163, 2004), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work163.pdf. For a discussion of Moody’s 
approach, see also Hu, supra note 82, at 10-17 (discussing Moody’s approach). 
 91. See Crouhy et al., supra note 47, at 10. 
 92. S&P CDO EVALUATOR, supra note 49, Appendix III (“Correlation 
Assumptions for CDO Evaluator Assets”). 
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flawed ratings assigned to mortgage-backed CDOs is that the correlation 
assumptions for default on mortgage-backed securities in the asset pools 
were far too low.93 Once the default probabilities and other factors such 
as recovery rates in the event of default are determined, Monte Carlo 
simulations are run, resulting in probabilistic distributions of loss 
throughout the asset pool.94 
After a loss distribution is determined, the second step is to 
determine how the projected losses would affect each individual tranche 
of the proposed CDO.95 In the CDO Evaluator model used by S&P, this 
is done by calculating the level of default each tranche must be able to 
withstand in order to achieve the targeted credit rating, or the “scenario 
loss rate.”96 The rating agency first determines the default rate on 
corporate bonds with the same rating and life as the rating sought for the 
particular tranche in question and for bonds of a maturity equal to the 
weighted average maturity of the CDO’s assets.97 Assume, for example, 
that corporate bonds with a 7-year life and a rating of AA have a 2% 
chance of default. The scenario loss rate then is the default rate for the 
particular tranche in question that has a no greater than 2% chance of 
being exceeded under the loss distribution calculated in the first stage. 
Finally, the rating agency runs cash flow simulations to ensure that each 
tranche will meet its scheduled interest and principal payments in the 
event of defaults up to the scenario loss rate. Credit enhancement 
ensuring that a trache will meet its obligations in the event of losses is 
provided by the tranche’s subordination level, i.e., the amount of 
securities below it in the capital structure, the excess payment levels of 
the collateral relative to the interest and principal owed by the CDO, or 
its “overcollateralization,” as well as reserve accounts and third-party 
insurance. 
As the massive amount of downgrades of CDO securities 
demonstrates, the ratings generated by the CRAs’ models were, to put it 
                                                                                                                                         
 93. See, e.g., Crouhy et al., supra note 47, at 45; Mason & Rosner, supra note 36, 
at 25; see also Charles C. Calomiris, The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s New, 
and What’s Next, 15 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 6, 13 (2009) (explaining that expected losses 
on subprime RMBS pools were only 4.5% in 2004, and rose to roughly 6.0% in 2006). 
 94. See Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers, supra note 26, at 76. 
 95. See Crouhy et al., supra note 47, at 10. 
 96. S&P CDO EVALUATOR, supra note 49, at 10. 
 97. See Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers, supra note 26, at 77. 
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mildly, unreliable. As observers have noted, any quantitative model is 
subject to the limitations of 1) its assumptions, and 2) the quality of its 
inputs.98 In the case of ABS ratings in general, both the assumptions 
behind the model and the accuracy of the data concerning the underlying 
collateral, particularly for CDOs formed in 2006 and 2007, failed to 
produce a rating that would reflect the creditworthiness of the security 
being rated. The reasons for this stem from faulty data, as well as the 
assumptions used to interpret it, and the tranched structure of the CDO 
securities themselves. 
In order to come up with a correlation number comparable to the 
correlation numbers used to estimate the risk of default of corporate 
bonds, the CRAs resorted to data on CDS prices on MBSs. Such 
information would track the risk of default for such bonds, as a CDS 
functioned as insurance on such prices. This method for estimating 
default was used because information on the risk of default of actual 
mortgages simply was not available.99 In theory this may have been a 
plausible strategy, but in practice it had serious flaws: the data used was 
limited to a time of rising house prices, the 1990s and 2000s,100 and so 
failed to capture the effect of a decline in house prices on CDOs built on 
real estate assets. It also failed to capture important changes in the 
mortgage market, as mortgage products such as interest-only, adjustable 
rate and low and no-documentation loans had not even existed during 
the periods the CDS data was taken from.101 Given that many of the new 
mortgage products depended on rising house prices in order to avoid 
default, the new mortgage forms were not economically comparable to 
the traditional, fixed-rate mortgages,102 and so the CDS price data on 
mortgages securities from the 1990s would not correlate with the 
defaults to be expected in the housing market of 2004-2007. As a result, 
the correlation numbers stand out as perhaps the single most important 
                                                                                                                                         
 98. Professor Coffee, for example, notes the “GIGO Effect,” or “Garbage In, 
Garbage Out.” See Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 54, at 16. In his discussion of 
ratings models, Frank Partnoy also states that “However sophisticated their techniques, 
they are subject to the limitations of ‘garbage in, garbage out.’” Partnoy, How and Why 
Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, supra note 26, at 77. 
 99. See Salmon, Recipe for Disaster, supra note 5. 
 100. Id.; see also Mason & Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go?, supra note 36, at 25-
26. 
 101. See Mason & Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go?, supra note 36, at 26; Coval et 
al., The Economics of Structured Finance, supra note 15, at 15. 
 102. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text. 
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flaw in the models used by the CRAs.103 The risk of default of the 
underlying assets in the asset pool in a time of widespread economic 
distress was not accurately captured; because the ratings models 
employed non-comparable data to judge correlation, they implicitly 
assumed that housing prices would continue to rise. By including many 
hundreds and thousands of assets in their asset pools, CDOs were 
thought to diversify risk, but due to these assets’ sensitivity to a decline 
in real estate prices, and ultimately, a general economic decline, they 
instead were exposed to great systemic risk which they themselves 
created.104 
A second informational flaw with the CDO concerns the quality of 
the collateral and the ability of the sponsors to fill their asset pools with 
the lowest quality collateral necessary to still achieve a desired rating. 
Benmelech & Dlugosz, and their student Anna Katherine Barnett-Hart, 
argue that the remarkable consistency of the capital structures of CDOs 
and CLOs is evidence that sponsors became adept at manipulating the 
ratings models to achieve given ratings for their tranches at the lowest 
possible cost.105 CDOs thus became a dumping ground for low-quality, 
fixed-income assets that the banks could not otherwise dispose of, with 
the ratings models functioning as a sort of alchemical technique that 
appeared, for a time, to turn this dross into highly-rated gold. The use of 
subprime mortgages in ABSs and CDOs in 2005 and 2006 suggests this, 
as does the creation of mezzanine CDOs-squared, CDOs built on 
mezzanine-level CDO securities that the banks found it difficult to sell. 
CDOs therefore became a way to sell ‘lemons’ which were not 
recognized as such due to the fact that investors, and even to some 
                                                                                                                                         
 103. See sources cited supra note 93. 
 104. See Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, supra note 15, at 18 
(explaining that with pooling, losses become “driven entirely by the systematic risk 
exposure”); GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW UNRESTRAINED GREED CORRUPTED A 
DREAM, SHATTERED GLOBAL MARKETS AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 121 (2009) 
[hereinafter, TETT, FOOL’S GOLD] (“The more that banks all relied on Li’s Guassian 
copula approach, the more they were creating a new form of correlation risk.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 105. Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 41, at 632-33 (uniformity of CDO structures 
suggests that sponsors were using ratings software “to achieve the highest possible 
credit rating at the lowest possible cost”); Anna Katherine Barnett-Hart, The Story of 
the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis 94 (unpublished A.B. thesis, 
Harvard Univ.), (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/students/dunlop/2009-CDOmeltdown.pdf [hereinafter Barnett-Hart, The Story of 
the CDO Market Meltdown]. 
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extent the CRAs, were unaware of the informational flaws inherent in 
CDOs due to their internal complexity as well as the flaws in the ratings 
models. 
3. Compounding Errors 
Finally, the effects of the first two informational failures are 
compounded when first-tier ABSs are used as collateral for higher-level 
CDOs. A CDO backed by RMBS securities is already a second-tier 
structured finance security, and so any errors in the initial ratings 
process of the RMBS are compounded in the second ratings process 
when the tranches are rated to create an ABS CDO. Furthermore, as the 
structured finance boom progressed, CDO2s (“squared”) and even 
CDO3s (“cubed”) were formed to repackage the mezzanine-level CDO 
securities that the banks found it difficult to sell to investors. 
In The Economics of Structured Finance, Joshua Coval, Jakub 
Jurek and Erik Stafford explain the magnifying effects of the pooling 
and tranching structure on default probability.106 Combined with the 
extremely fine-grained differentiations in default probabilities that the 
ratings scales used by the CRAs indicate, these magnifying effects 
produced CDO ratings that were very sensitive to mistakes in correlation 
and default probability numbers in their underlying collateral. Coval et 
al. begin by constructing a hypothetical group of 40 CDOs, each with 
100 bonds in its asset pool.107 Each bond has a five-year default 
probability of 5% and a recovery rate of 50% upon default.108 Default 
correlation of any two bonds in the asset pool is 20%, and defaults of 
bonds in different asset pools are uncorrelated. Each CDO is composed 
of three tranches, where the junior tranche absorbs all losses until the 
portfolio loss reaches 6%, at which point it becomes worthless, the 
mezzanine tranche then absorbs all losses up to 12% and then the senior 
tranche absorbs all following losses.109 There is also a CDO2 constructed 
of all the mezzanine tranches from the original 40 CDOs. 
Given the rating scale published by Fitch, in which investment 
grade bonds (from AAA to BBB-) had annualized default probabilities 
ranging from 0.02% to 0.75%,110 while speculative grade bonds (BB+ to 
                                                                                                                                         
 106. See Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, supra note 15, at 15. 
 107. Id. at 9. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 10. 
 110. Id. at 8. 
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C) ranged from 1.07% to 29.96%,111 the hypothetical CDOs were very 
sensitive to changes in the assumed correlation figures, as well as 
default probabilities. For example, increasing the default correlation 
from 20% to 40% in the case of the CDO led to a decrease in the rating 
of the mezzanine tranche from BBB- to BB-, while the senior tranche 
fell from AAA to A+.112 With the CDO2, the results were particularly 
pronounced in the case of the mezzanine tranche: here, increasing 
default correlation alone from 20% to 40% caused the security to lose its 
investment grade standing, falling from AAA to B+.113 In the case of the 
CDO2 senior tranche, increasing the default probability from 5.00% to 
12.50% caused its rating to collapse, from AAA to B-.114 And, as Coval 
et al. point out, real estate-backed CDOs should really be understood as 
CDO2s, because their underlying RMBSs already resecuritize an 
original securitization of mortgages.   
The Economics of Structured Finance is a vivid and succinct 
presentation of the phenomena institutional investors and others watched 
with horror in 2008, as large amounts of CDOs and CDO2s suffered 
drastic downgrades, and then collapsed in value. The power of CDOs to 
insulate their higher tranches from defaults within the collateral pool 
during normal economic conditions simultaneously exposed the higher 
tranches to great sensitivity in ratings, particularly given the very fine 
gradations in default probability expressed in the investment grade 
ratings scales. As Coval et al. illustrate, the pooling and tranching 
structure essential to structured finance served to compound the 
sensitivity of these securities to small errors in estimates of the 
underlying default correlation, default probability and other aspects of 
the creditworthiness of the underlying collateral pool. 
D. RATINGS MODELS AS THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF FLAWED RATINGS 
In the aftermath of the credit crisis, as the foreclosure crisis 
mounted and the recession took hold in the U.S. and abroad, significant 
attention was focused on the CRAs. Investors realized that structured 
finance securities were assigned ratings that failed to capture their true 
                                                                                                                                         
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 15 (Table 3, “Effects of Changes in Underlying Parameters on CDO and 
CDO2 Tranche Ratings”). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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risks, by significant margins. Quite naturally, the issuer-pays business 
model of the CRAs came in for severe criticism, with critics focusing on 
the fundamental conflict of interest embodied in having issuers pay the 
CRAs directly for ratings of their securities. 
In what follows, I argue that while conflicts of interest were a 
crucial secondary cause of flawed ratings, a close look at structured 
finance ratings and the skewed factors in the ratings models leads to the 
conclusion that in the first instance flawed ratings can be explained by 
the flawed ratings models and their inputs, without any need to resort to 
the human agency on the part of CRA managers that conflicts of interest 
entail. The appropriate place for conflicts of interest in an account of the 
ratings fiasco is as an aggravating secondary cause, where the desire to 
please paying clients led managers to turn away from a rigorous 
examination of the assumptions and data used by their ratings models, to 
construct a ratings system they knew or should have known was being 
gamed by their clients, and in at least one instance, cover up for a flawed 
ratings model by making offsetting changes to the model when the flaw 
was uncovered.115 It must be conceded to those who emphasize the role 
of conflicts of interest in the ratings disaster that conflicted behavior 
made the credit crisis much worse than it had to have been, by letting 
the housing bubble and structured finance boom continue for perhaps 
two or three years longer than it otherwise would have. Had the CRAs 
stopped issuing flawed ratings in 2004 or 2005, when doubts about the 
ratings system began to surface and economists began to wonder if 
housing prices were sustainable, the effects of the credit crisis would 
likely have been greatly diminished. Nevertheless, the primary cause of 
flawed ratings is the reliance on quantitative ratings models containing 
serious technical flaws. The development of the ratings models occurred 
over a number of years, and key elements of the system, which CDO 
sponsors took advantage of, such as the grounding assumptions and the 
make-up of the data fed into them, were in place a number of years 
before the 2006-2007 disaster period for ratings accuracy. By the time 
the influence of any conflicts of interest could have been felt, the 
inherent mechanical flaws with the ratings systems were already at work 
generating seriously flawed ratings, which in turn created increased 
demand for CDO securities, further inflating U.S. housing prices. Had 
managers at the CRAs had the proper incentives to rigorously question 
                                                                                                                                         
 115. Cf. Sam Jones, When Junk Was Gold, FIN. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 18, 2008, at 
16. 
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the efficacy of their ratings models and the veracity of the data supplied 
to them by structured finance issuers, and to stop sponsors from 
manipulating the ratings models when it appeared that they were doing 
so, the damage from flawed ratings most likely would have been 
lessened. However, the fundamental importance of the mechanical flaws 
in the ratings models, as well as the fact that the flawed ratings models 
were operative long before the CDO sponsors began to engage in 
widespread manipulation, argues for the models themselves as the germ 
of the ratings disaster, not human decisions motivated by a desire to 
please paying clients. 
What evidence is there to support this position? First, a remarkable 
study that tested conflicts of interest in CDO ratings came to an 
equivocal conclusion on the question of whether conflicts of interest 
resulted in more inaccurate ratings. Anna Katherine Barnett-Hart’s 
study, “The Story of the CDO Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis,” 
included a test of conflicts of interest in the assignment of credit ratings 
by the CRAs.116 Her Hypothesis 3F, “Conflicts of Interest,” tests 
whether “[c]onflicts of interest caused by the fee system of credit ratings 
would result in more aggressive initial ratings, subsequently more 
downgrades, and worse accuracy in predictions for the CDOs of large 
underwriters.”117 In her study she ran regression analyses on data from 
735 U.S. CDOs issued from January 1999 through March 2009. The 
results for Hypothesis 3F were equivocal; bigger underwriters did 
receive higher initial amounts of securities rated AAA, as one would 
expect in a conflicted environment, where CRAs competed for issuers’ 
business.118 This is mitigated however by the fact that the “most prolific 
underwriters were producing worse CDOs,” so that even if they were 
treated the same as other underwriters, their CDOs suffered greater 
downgrades during the crisis.119 Barnett-Hart concludes that: 
Given the striking uniformity of initial CDO credit ratings and the 
fact that the prediction value of the asset credit ratings depended 
mainly on the quality of the underwriter, the latter explanation seems 
more likely, suggesting that the conflicts of interest [are] not as 
                                                                                                                                         
 116. See generally Barnett-Hart, The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown, supra 
note 105. 
 117. Id. at 45. 
 118. Id. at 79. 
 119. Id. 
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much to blame as simply a failure to distinguish among underwriter 
quality.120 
Among Barnett-Hart’s advisors at Harvard were Efraim Benmelech 
and Jennifer Dlugosz, who themselves carried out an interesting study of 
3,912 collateralized loan obligation tranches with the provocative title 
“The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings.”121 Benmelech and Dlugosz 
found that 70.7% of the securities by dollar value possessed a credit 
rating of AAA, while the weighted average credit rating of the collateral 
supporting these securities was only B+.122 Furthermore, they observed a 
deterioration of credit quality over time, with 2006 and 2007 vintage 
CDOs having lower quality collateral.123 Benmelech and Dlugosz 
conclude that “[a]s is typical in structured finance products, there is a 
gap between the credit ratings on the notes issued by CDOs and the 
credit quality of the underlying collateral.”124 The ratings models were 
the mechanism by which this alchemical transformation occurred. The 
comments of Federal Reserve Bank economist Adam Ashcraft on 
Benmelech and Dlugosz’s study are noteworthy.125 While not ruling out 
“dishonest mistakes” on the part of the CRAs, Ashcraft believes the 
nature of structured finance instruments themselves contributed to the 
errors the CRAs made and that “honest mistakes go a long way towards 
explaining how we got into this mess.”126 Ashcraft points out that 
because mortgage-backed securities are a static pool, as opposed to a 
dynamic corporate enterprise, systemic economic factors such as home 
price appreciation and employment levels assume much greater 
importance in assessing their risk than with a single corporate enterprise. 
Any errors relating to macroeconomic forecasting and the ratings 
                                                                                                                                         
 120. Id. For an article in the legal literature coming to a similar conclusion, see Clair 
A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities?, 71 
U. PITT. L. REV. 585 (2010). Professor Hill argues that the conventional conclusion that 
conflicts of interest caused the CRAs to issue flawed ratings “cannot be correct or even 
nearly so.” The alternative account she offers instead is that the ratings agencies “drank 
the Kool-Aid,” really believing that the new structured finance securities constructed by 
the “quants” at the investment banks conquered risk. Id. at 597-598. 
 121. Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 41, at 618, 626-29. 
 122. Id. at 628. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Adam B. Ashcraft, Discussion of Alchemy of CDO Ratings, 56 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 635 (2009). 
 126. Id. at 636. 
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models thus have great effect on the credit ratings, while analyst 
judgment is not so important. 
Within this universe of errors, three stand out as crucial failures, 
which, operating in conjunction with one another, appear strong enough 
to explain ratings failure. 
1. Collateral Quality 
As discussed above in Part I.C.1, “Risky Collateral,” the credit 
quality of the collateral in CDOs backed by residential real estate 
suffered a great decline, particularly at the peak of the housing boom, in 
2006 and 2007. Subprime issuance in 2001 stood at $190 billion, out of 
a total of $2.1 trillion total mortgage loans, or 8.9%.127 Subprime 
issuance peaked in 2005 at $625 billion, out of a total of $2.7 trillion 
mortgage loans, or 22.5%. Of these subprime loans, the percentage of 
full documentation loans fell from 76% in 2001 to 63% in 2005.128 
Mortgages without full documentation of pay stubs and income history 
would be much more likely to be subject to fraud and misreporting than 
mortgages issued in a traditional lending setting with rigorous screening 
of applicants. As noted above, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
reported substantial pressure on mortgage brokers to originate loans in 
order for their companies to feed to the structured finance operations of 
the Wall Street investment banks, and the SEC found significant 
evidence of fraud in the mortgages underlying CDOs when it conducted 
a study of CDO collateral cited in its 2008 Summary Report on the 
CRAs.129 In addition to the pressure on brokers to originate loans, which 
incentivized mortgage fraud, structural differences between subprime 
and traditional fixed-rate mortgages made subprime mortgages 
relatively riskier than fixed-rate mortgages, as Gary Gorton details.130 
The combination of mortgage fraud, possible indications of credit 
quality going unnoticed because of different levels of information 
gathered by lenders and mortgage purchasers and structural sensitivity 
to macroeconomic conditions combined to create risky collateral. It is 
                                                                                                                                         
 127. See Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 51, at 2 (Table 1, “Origination and 
Issue of Non-Agency Loans”). 
 128. See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 62, at 7 (Table 1, “Loan 
Characteristics at Origination for Different Vintages”). 
 129. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71. 
2012] INFORMATIONAL FAILURES 699 
IN STRUCTURED FINANCE 
 
now apparent that the CRAs were either unable to identify or ignored 
these weaknesses. 
2. Faulty Correlation Figures 
Along with default probability and recovery rates, correlation is one 
of the key parameters to assessing the credit risk of any pooled 
investment. “Correlation” is the likelihood that one asset in the collateral 
pool will default in the event another one does; if the likelihood that B 
will default if A does is 50%, correlation will equal 0.50, but if it is 
certain that B will default in the event A does, correlation will equal 1.131 
Underestimation of the correlation figures in the asset pools of 
structured finance securities therefore was a critical error, as it meant 
that the likelihood that one borrower would default on his mortgage 
when his neighbor across the street did so was underestimated. 
How did the CRAs and investment banks compute correlation for 
the assets in the asset pools of structured finance securities, and why did 
they underestimate it? The story of the computation of correlation 
figures is a crucial element of the explosion of structured finance on 
Wall Street during the first decade of the 2000s. The formulation and 
dissemination of an easily usable correlation formula allowed 
investment banks and credit rating agencies to price structured finance 
tranches much more effectively—or so it seemed at first.132 In 2000, 
David X. Li, a banker with a Ph.D. in actuarial science working at the 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, published On Default 
Correlation: A Copula Function Approach in the Journal of Fixed 
Income.133 Li proposed a method of using statistical price data to 
estimate the likelihood of default correlations between assets that used a 
Gaussian copula approach.134 For assets such as residential mortgages, 
the formula allowed the price of insurance on such mortgages—in the 
form of credit default swaps on RMBS bonds—to substitute for actual 
                                                                                                                                         
 131. See the illuminating discussion of correlation in Salmon, Recipe for Disaster, 
supra note 5. 
 132. See Salmon, Recipe for Disaster, supra note 5; TETT, FOOL’S GOLD, supra note 
104, at 120-122. 
 133. See Li, supra note 17. 
 134. See generally Donald MacKenzie, End-of-the-World Trade, LONDON REV. 
BOOKS, May 8, 2008, at 24-26. 
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data on defaults.135 Insurance on such defaults was a useful proxy 
because of the lack of historical data on mortgage defaults. 
Several flaws to this approach eventually undermined it. First, the 
CDS data that was available stretched back only to the 1990s, when 
CDSs began to be sold on RMBSs.136 During this short time frame, 
home prices had only risen on a national basis, not fallen, and in a rising 
market the amount of defaults will be lower than in a stagnant or falling 
one.137 The cost of insurance on such mortgages would be low, 
reflecting a relatively low risk of default. In addition, this data preceded 
the development of newer forms of mortgages such as ARMs or IOs, 
which allowed riskier borrowers to own a home.138 But the structure of 
these mortgages differed in key ways from the traditional fixed-rate 
mortgage, as noted above.139 As a result, the risk inherent in the 
subprime and Alt-A mortgages that proliferated during the housing 
boom was much greater than in the bulk of the mortgages that had been 
used until then. 
A second glaring flaw connected to the use of the Guassian copula 
approach came with the development of synthetic CDOs at the height of 
the boom, in 2005 and 2006.140 At this point, demand for mortgages was 
so voracious that sponsors could not find enough collateral to put in the 
pools.141 To replicate the payouts from RMBSs, sponsors took to selling 
CDSs referencing the mortgage bonds.142 The CDS seller would receive, 
in return for agreeing to cover any losses on the reference asset, an 
upfront payment as well as periodic payments thereafter; essentially, 
payments for insuring the bond.143 Because the payments were keyed to 
                                                                                                                                         
 135. See Salmon, Recipe for Disaster, supra note 5. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See Zimmerman, supra note 63, at 8-10; GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE 
HAND, supra note 2, at 81. 
 138. While subprime lending developed on a wide scale in the 1990’s, newer 
mortgage forms such as ARMs and IOs were introduced after 2000 in order to meet the 
affordability challenge that rising home prices presented to buyers. See Zimmerman, 
supra note 63, at 8-10; see also Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, 
supra note 15, at 15. 
 139. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text. 
 140. See generally Whitehouse, supra note 18, at A1. 
 141. See TETT, FOOL’S GOLD, supra note 104, at 299 (quoting former J.P. Morgan 
lawyer Andrew Feldstein); Crouhy et al., supra note 44, at 17. 
 142. Crouhy et al., supra note 47, at 17; see also the FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 
142-143. 
 143. See CDOs in Plain English, supra note 40, at 5. 
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the health of the reference asset, a “synthetic” CDO could be 
constructed with CDSs substituting for actual bonds in the collateral 
pool. The effect of widespread selling of CDSs on RMBS and other 
structured finance securities, however, would have been to drive down 
the price of CDSs.144 When such prices were used in correlation 
formulae, they would underestimate the riskiness of such assets, as this 
insurance was in effect sold too cheaply.145 On multiple levels therefore, 
the data used in the correlation formulae underestimated the risk of 
default. 
The Guassian copula formula thus appears to be an example of a 
model that ends up shaping financial reality in its attempt to measure 
it.146 By ignoring the limitations of the formula’s approach, which its 
author and others were well aware of,147 banking and CRA personnel 
further inflated the housing bubble by underpricing the risk inherent in 
the very securities they were rating, and consequently pricing, as they 
used the Gaussian copula approach to do so. 
3. Ratings Arbitrage 
The overoptimistic correlation figures used in the ratings formulae 
are a purely mechanical, quantitative cause of flawed ratings. They are 
so important that a number of commentators focus on them as the key to 
ratings failures.148 The flaws in the underlying collateral that went into 
first-tier structured finance securities, which were then re-securitized in 
                                                                                                                                         
 144. See Colleen Marie O’Connor, Synthetic ABS Indexes Attracting a Crowd 
Introduction of CMBX Offers Another Way to Take Punts on Real Estate, INV. 
DEALERS’ DIG., Mar. 13, 2006 (the effect of collateral managers investing in ABX.HE-
type indices would have to be taken into account in CDO ratings). For general 
discussions of the credit expansion during the housing boom and its effect on perceived 
risk, see Bruce I. Jacobs, Tumbling Tower of Babel: Subprime Securitization and the 
Credit Crisis, 65(2) FIN. ANALYSTS’ J. 17, 23 (2009) (internal citation omitted), and 
Hyun Song Shin, Securitisation and Financial Stability, 119 THE ECON. J. 309 (2009). 
 145. See Whitehouse’s prescient discussion, supra note 18, about the temptations to 
hedge fund managers and others to sell credit default swaps for use in CDOs without 
fully understanding the risk involved. AIG also fell into this trap with sales of CDSs on 
CDOs by its infamous Financial Products unit. See TETT, FOOL’S GOLD, supra note 
104, at 72-73; Mollenkamp et al., supra note 56. 
 146. See DONALD MACKENZIE, AN ENGINE, NOT A CAMERA: HOW FINANCIAL 
MODELS SHAPE MARKETS 12-35 (MIT Press 2006). 
 147. See Whitehouse, supra note 18 (quoting David Li and Darrell Duffie). 
 148. See supra note 93. 
702 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
CDOs backed by RMBS, are primarily attributable to the mortgage 
brokers and then the investment banks which placed the assets into 
collateral pools, not the CRAs. At least until widespread doubts began to 
surface concerning whether the American real estate market was in fact 
in a bubble, then, it seems to me that the CRAs are guilty only of failing 
to examine the mortgages and other collateral backing the complex 
securities they rated and of being complacent about their ratings 
methods, i.e., turning away from any rigorous examination of the 
assumptions and data used in their models. In early years of the 2000s, 
on the other hand, they do not appear to have consciously colluded with 
sponsors to produce overoptimistic ratings.149 Faulty correlation figures 
and low collateral quality themselves could fundamentally skew the 
validity of ratings to such a degree as to make them unreliable. In 
addition to these two failings, however, the first of which was purely 
mechanical, CDO sponsors actively engaged in a process of arbitrage. 
The third central quantitative flaw of the ratings system, ratings 
arbitrage, arose when CDO sponsors realized that the value of certain 
assets as categorized by the ratings models differed from the value of the 
same assets in the financial markets or as packaged in different 
structured finance vehicles. The ratings models therefore offered CDO 
sponsors valuable arbitrage opportunities. As with the flaws in the 
underlying collateral discussed above, the CRAs do not appear to bear 
primary responsibility for the ratings arbitrage that fundamentally 
corrupted the ratings system insofar as they merely constructed models 
                                                                                                                                         
 149. As I go on to emphasize, this is not to deny that there were incidents reported 
during 2005 and after which suggest the CRAs turned a blind eye to suspicions that 
sponsors were gaming their models, or even that they enabled sponsors to do so in the 
later stages of the real estate bubble. See, e.g., the emails discussed in the SEC 2008 
SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 51, at 12-14, 24-26. The only emails from 2004 
discussed in this SEC report concern awareness that a particular agency was taking 
actions that could jeopardize its market share in structured finance ratings. For 
allegations that the CRAs were in fact colluding with the investment banks prior to 
2005, see Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 
178 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ratings for Cheyne SIV issued in summer 2004). I simply argue 
that both the temporal and causal origins of the flawed ratings are in the flawed 
quantitative systems, not any predetermined plan to collude with sponsors to produce 
securities with high ratings that the parties knew would fail. After flawed ratings began 
to produce massive revenue streams for both sponsors and the CRAs, the temptation to 
game the system on the one hand, and to enable this manipulation on the other, was too 
great to resist. Therefore, conflicts of interest are a contributing secondary cause of 
ratings failure. 
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attempting to gauge the riskiness of complex securities. It was the 
investment banks sponsoring the transactions that first discovered how 
to game the system and began to do so.150 That said, the CRAs 
eventually came to realize that sponsors were gaming the ratings models 
and appear to have facilitated such activity.151 If this view of ratings 
arbitrage is correct, conflicted behavior after the point at which the 
CRAs had become aware that their models offered their clients valuable 
arbitrage opportunities would bear responsibility for flawed ratings. In 
order to achieve an accurate understanding of the ratings fiasco, though, 
it is important to emphasize that ratings arbitrage and the CRAs 
conflicted response to it was 1) an opportunistic exploitation of an 
underlying mechanical flaw in the ratings systems, and 2) was 
subsequent in time to the pre-existing flawed operation of the ratings 
system. 
How did ratings arbitrage take place? It appears to have operated 
on both “gross” and “fine” levels. First, the most basic type, gross 
aribitrage, arose out of variances in default probabilities across asset 
categories, as captured in the following chart put out by Nomura based 
on data by Standard & Poor’s:152 
                                                                                                                                         
 150. See, e.g., Louise Storey, Prosecutors Ask if 8 Banks Duped Ratings Agencies, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A1 (discussing allegations that ratings arbitrage began 
with the investment banks). 
 151. See Lowenstein, supra note 88 (quoting a former Moody’s employee as saying 
that “[e]very agency has a model available to bankers that allows them to run the 
numbers until they get something they like and send it in for a rating.”); see also 
Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 41, at 632 (Figure 7, reproducing page from S&P’s 
CDO Evaluator Handbook, Version 3.0 (2006) that states, in reference to Excess 
Collateral, “[t]his tells what percentage of asset notional needs to be eliminated (added) 
in order for the transaction to provide just enough (i.e. ROC equal to 100%) support at a 
given level.”). 
 152. Mark H. Adelson, Bond Ratings Confusion, NOMURA FIXED INCOME RESEARCH 
8, (June 29, 2006), available at www.securitization.net/pdf/Nomura/Nomura_Bond_ 
Rating_Confusion_Update.pdf (Exhibit 4, “Default Probabilities Used in S&P Ratings 
Criteria”). Mason & Rosner also use this chart to support their discussion of ratings 
arbitrage, supra note 36, at 66-68 (“Ratings Arbitrage: CDO Ratings Methods Are 
Looser than RMBS Ratings Methods, Even When CDOs are Solely made up of 
RMBS”). 
704 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
 
The chart above illustrates that, for a given rating, asset-backed 
securities (first-tier SF securities) had the lowest default probabilities, 
followed by corporate bonds and then CDOs. This discrepancy in the 
meaning of the same ratings as applied to different types of bonds meant 
that converting one type of bond to another could result in a different, 
and potentially more lucrative, rating for the same underlying assets. In 
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particular, converting short-term ABSs to long-term CDOs resulted in a 
substantial increase in the credit rating. For example, in the chart above, 
a 3-year ABS with a credit rating of BBB would have an estimated 
default probability of 0.7%, but if packaged into a 7-year CDO, it could 
garner a rating of AA, which has an estimated default probability of 
0.8%. In their discussion of ratings arbitrage, Mason & Rosner conclude 
that the “ability to repackage financial securities and call them 
something else, with no fundamental change to their risk characteristics, 
in order to achieve an improved bond rating is the fundamental source of 
ratings arbitrage.”153 
The second type of arbitrage operated in a more subtle manner, 
where there was a mismatch between the rating assigned to a particular 
asset and its price. Because the ratings for structured finance tranches 
relied on the ratings of the assets in the asset pool, if the marketplace 
recognized that an asset was distressed in some way, yet the ratings 
agencies did not (they were often slow to downgrade bonds, for 
example), CDO sponsors could convert that mismatch into value. Frank 
Partnoy discusses the example of GM and Ford bonds, which sold at 
low prices relative to their credit ratings in May 2005 because financial 
markets recognized their distress before the CRAs did.154 The mismatch 
allowed CDO sponsors to convert low quality collateral to higher quality 
CDO tranches because investors were fooled by the package these assets 
came in—the CDO securities with ratings attached. The mismatch 
allowed CDO sponsors to select assets with prices reflecting their flaws 
but which had not (yet) been downgraded, place them into CDOs and 
then pocket the difference.  The ratings given by the CRAs functioned 
as seals of approval for low quality assets. 
Ratings arbitrage was primarily the result of issuers learning how to 
game the system set in place by the CRAs. Yet eventually, the CRAs 
appear to have done more than turn a blind eye to ratings arbitrage: they 
likely encouraged it. First, the ratings process was iterative—sponsors 
approached the agencies with the details of a proposed transaction, 
including the tranches to be issued, payment waterfalls and attachment 
points, types and amounts of collateral, the collateral manager and other 
important details of a CDO.155 The CRAs would then issue preliminary 
                                                                                                                                         
 153. Mason & Rosner, supra note 36, at 68. 
 154. Partnoy, How And Why Credit Ratings Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers, supra note 26, at 80 (citing Whitehouse, supra note 18). 
 155. See Gretchen Morgenson & Lousie Storey, Rating Agencies Shared Data, And 
Wall St. Seized Advantage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A1 (describing the extent to 
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ratings.156 These preliminary ratings functioned as a guide to the 
sponsors in constructing a CDO that also allowed them to maximize the 
difference between the cost of the collateral and the value of the 
tranches of CDO securities to be issued, engaging in the second type of 
arbitrage. Indeed, the CRAs appear to have understood this, as an 
excerpt from Standard & Poor’s CDO Evaluator Handbook, Version 3.0, 
indicates. Next to the heading “Excess Collateral,” which provides 
crucial credit enhancement in a CDO, but which is costly for the sponsor 
to provide, Standard & Poor’s states: “This tells what percentage of 
asset notional needs to be eliminated (added) in order for the transaction 
to provide just enough (i.e. ROC equal to 100%) support at a given 
rating level.”157 At this point it appears the CRAs were guiding their 
structured finance clients in gaming the ratings system they had 
constructed. It was widely known that the investment banks were 
engaging in ratings arbitrage, as personnel at the banks labelled the 
practice as such, and it would be unlikely that CRA personnel were 
unaware of the opportunities their models offered to clever bankers.158 
Here we reach the point at which the primary cause of flawed 
quantitative models and data bleeds over into the secondary cause of 
conflicts of interest at the CRAs. It could be argued that since the 
reaction to any purely mechanical flaws ultimately determined whether 
or not flawed ratings were produced, conflicts of interest are actually the 
root cause of ratings failure. An argument against this view is that the 
ratings systems and structured finance industry developed organically 
over the course of a decade, with certain developments and changes 
leading to further responses in a pattern of mutual interaction. For 
example, David X. Li’s Guassian copula function enabled structured 
finance to take off in the first years of the decade. Low interest rates in 
the wake of September 11, 2001 gave further fuel to rising housing 
                                                                                                                                         
which the CRAs collaborated with CDO arrangers); Mason & Rosner, supra note 36, at 
13 (“[I]n structured finance, the rating agency is an active part of the structuring of the 
deal.”); Partnoy, How And Why Credit Ratings Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers, supra note 26, at 79 (investment banks structuring the CDO run the 
mathematical models and then present CRAs with results). 
 156. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86. 
 157. Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 41, at 632 (Figure 7, reproducing page from 
S&P’s CDO Evaluator Handbook, Version 3.0 (2006)) (emphasis in original). 
 158. See Storey, supra note 150 (discussing use of the term “ratings arbitrage” at 
Goldman Sachs); see also James Lumley, Barclays Used Credit Ratings ‘Arbitrage’ for 
CDOs, Court Told, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 19, 2011. 
2012] INFORMATIONAL FAILURES 707 
IN STRUCTURED FINANCE 
 
prices, as mortgage interest rates were lowered.159 By 2005, the shortage 
of mortgage bonds in the marketplace led to the explosion of synthetic 
CDOs referencing real estate bonds. It is likely that within this pattern, 
sponsors discovered commercial advantages such as discrepancies 
between the marketprice and the value of a rating assigned to the same 
asset in a gradual process of trial and error, and then began to exploit 
them. Furthermore, it is likely that when correlation numbers were first 
generated using CDS prices only going back to the 1990s, since there 
was no other data available, this was a plausible technique that seemed 
to generate a reliable figure. On the other hand, when the CRAs were 
using the same techniques six years years later at the height of the 
spectacular boom in structured finance issuances and the American real 
estate market, it is implausible that they were unaware of the ways in 
which their ratings systems were being manipulated to create such a 
massive bubble. 
Part II considers the implications of this view for IRCRA. Part I.E 
next inquires into the theoretical and practical implications of the 
informational failures of CDOs and their ratings. 
E. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CDOS AS INHERENTLY FLAWED 
Given the difficulties in obtaining an accurate picture of the true 
risk embodied in a CDO’s collateral pool, it is now clear that investors 
were purchasing securities they believed were much less risky, and 
hence more valuable, than they really were. In economic terms, 
investors possessed incomplete information concerning the assets they 
purchased. Because these securities were relatively new, and very 
complex—at least in the forms proliferating in the past decade, such as 
CDOs backed by subprime RMBSs, CDOs-squared, and synthetic 
CDOs—financial markets participants lacked the experience necessary 
to properly understand them; in particular, there was no track record 
indicating how the new securities would perform under declining 
conditions in the housing market and the economy as a whole.160 The 
events of 2007 and 2008 illustrate that real estate-backed CDOs required 
not only that home prices not fall, but that they continue to rise, i.e., 
                                                                                                                                         
 159. See Brunnermeier, supra note 2, at 77; the FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5, 88, 
443 (dissenting statement of P. Wallison and A. Burns). 
 160. See Salmon, Recipe for Disaster, supra note 5; Coval et al., The Economics of 
Structured Finance, supra note 15, at 15. 
708 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
these CDOs were only viable in the context of an inflating housing 
bubble that would support their collateral.161 Investors were not aware of 
this at the time of course, and so they embraced a wide variety of 
structured finance products, many of which, the real estate-backed CDO 
tranches in particular, soon experienced severe price declines.162 Due to 
their complexity and the tendancy for information to get lost within 
them, in hindsight real-estate backed CDOs at least were fundamentally 
flawed investments. 
Within economics the study of the problem of informational 
failures stems from George Akerlof’s famous paper The Market for 
Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.163 Looking at 
the markets for structured finance securities in the wake of their crash, 
this section presents the following analysis: CDOs embody a substantial 
lemons problem, but until the financial crisis buyers were not aware of 
this problem. Rather, CDOs were what I term “lemons in disguise.” 
Contrary to pre-crisis explanations for CDOs, which theorize that 
structured finance securities overcome a lemons problem, in hindsight it 
is clear the informational problems inherent in certain types of CDOs 
(e.g., CDOs backed by subprime mortgages) swamp whatever 
informational problems they may solve or other economic efficiencies 
they offer.164 The CDO structure embodies a potential lemons problem 
                                                                                                                                         
 161. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text. 
 162. See David Reilly, Merrill Bites Credit Bullet; Thain’s CDO Sale Could Inspire 
Peers to Join Bloodletting, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2008, at C.16. 
 163. 84(3) Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 164. As discussed below, this analysis differs substantially from sunnier 
explanations for CDOs offered prior to the crisis, where CDOs were thought to 
overcome a lemons problem. See, e.g., Peter M. DeMarzo, supra note 27, at 2-3. See 
generally Peter M. DeMarzo & Darrell Duffie, A Liquidity-Based Model of Security 
Design, 67 ECONOMETRICA 65; Hayne Leland & David Pyle, Informational 
Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371 (1977). 
In the legal literature, see generally Claire Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener 
for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996); Edward M. Iocabucci & Ralph Winter, 
Asset Securitization and Asymmetric Information, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 161 (2005); Engle 
& McCoy, supra note 48, at 2054-63. The pooling and tranching structure was thought 
to overcome the lemons problem of individually flawed assets in a CDO’s asset pool. 
What economists and legal scholars as well as investors were unaware of prior to the 
crisis is the extent to which flawed correlation figures, ratings arbitrage and flawed 
collateral corrupted the entire process, creating massive systemic risk that would 
swamp whatever risk from individual bad mortgages that CDOs were thought to 
overcome in these pre-crisis analyses. 
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itself because it is impossible on a practical level for investors to know 
the true credit risk of CDO securities. 
Given the likelihood that this lemon problem is real, due to the 
severity of the informational flaws discussed in Parts I.C and I.D, it may 
be that certain segments of the structured finance marketplace will never 
return now that investors are aware of them. While as of Spring 2011 
many segments of the American capital markets have returned to levels 
close to those before the credit crisis, structured finance issuances (with 
the notable exception of plain vanilla ABSs backed by government-
insured mortgages) are a shadow of their former levels. Indeed, the 
worst affected category, U.S issuances of RMBSs not backed by the 
U.S. government (“Non-Agency” RMBSs), has fallen to a mere $12.1 
billion for 2010, or 0.016% of its high of $ 740.2 billion in 2005.165  
 
1. Theoretical Implication: Real Estate-Backed  
CDOs as “Lemons in Disguise” 
 
Part I.A above details the growth of the housing bubble and 
structured finance, and Part I.B sets forth the structural elements of the 
CDO. Information asymmetries are inherent in this story: mortgage 
lenders knew much more about the mortgages they offered than their 
borrowers did, particularly the ill-informed or disadvantaged borrowers 
in the subprime sector. In the CDO rating process itself, sponsors either 
turned a blind eye to the quality of the collateral they purchased from 
mortgage originators, or purposefully sought out the lowest quality, least 
expensive collateral that would still support a desired rating for a CDO’s 
tranches as a whole.166 Of course, purchasers of the CDO tranches were 
unaware of these activities. At all the important stages in the CDO 
construction process prior to purchase, sellers had a much clearer 
understanding of the product on offer than buyers. 
This situation is similar to the classic lemons problem that Akerlof 
explores in The Market for Lemons, with one crucial difference: until the 
real estate bubble popped, and the financial community gradually 
realized that real estate-backed CDOs were dependent on a rising 
market, not just a stable one, buyers do not appear to have been aware 
                                                                                                                                         
 165. U.S. Mortgage-Related Securities Issuance, SIFMA, http://www.sifma.org/ 
research/statistics.aspx (last visited May 2, 2011). 
 166. See supra Part I.D.3 (discussing ratings arbitrage). 
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that some of the many products on offer were in fact lemons.167 What is 
more, not all the sellers were aware of this, even though the astute ones 
were. As Gary Gorton points out, big players such as Citibank, UBS and 
Merrill Lynch suffered extensive losses in the subprime disaster.168 On 
the other hand, hedge funds and investment banks that realized in 2005 
and 2006 that the securitization of subprime would end in disaster 
profited handsomely, including Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, John 
Paulson and others.169 
In his discussion of information asymmetries, Akerlof explains that 
in a market where sellers, but not buyers, have knowledge that some of 
the products on offer are worthless, trading in that market will cease.  
Imagine a used car market where 25% of the cars are worthless (value of 
$0), while 75% have a value of $4,000. The average value of a car will 
therefore be $3,000, or $4,000 x .75. If buyers are aware that 25% of the 
cars are worthless, but not which specific ones, they will be willing to 
pay $3,000 for a car in this market. According to Akerlof, sellers will 
not be willing to sell in such a market170: a seller with a car worth $4,000 
will not be willing to let it go for $3,000. As a result, trading in such 
markets will dry up.171 Of course, in the real world used cars do sell, 
though at a steep discount from their prices when new on the dealership 
lot. Sales only occur when the seller values the asset at a lower price 
than the buyer, despite the “lemons discount.” 
Before the credit crisis, financial economists posited that structured 
finance securities existed as a mechanism to overcome a lemons 
problem. In The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of 
Informed Intermediation, Peter DeMarzo theorized that tranched 
securities solve the problem that an intermediary in the financial markets 
faces when it wants to sell numerous assets about which it has private 
                                                                                                                                         
 167. See generally, Frank Partnoy, Ivar Kreuger, the Credit-Rating Agencies, and 
Two Theories about the Function, and Dysfunction, of Markets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 431 
(2009); see also the FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 133; sources cited infra note 307.. 
 168. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 2, at 138. 
 169. Kate Kelly, Gregory Zuckerman & Carrick Mollenkamp, Ducking the 
Subprime Hit, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2007, at C1; Gregory Zuckerman, Trader Made 
Billions on Subprime, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008, at A1. 
 170. Akerlof, supra note 163, at 490. 
 171. See Akerlof, supra note 163, at 491. 
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information but the buyers do not, and the buyers know this.172 
According to DeMarzo, the greater the amount of assets the 
intermediary wants to sell, the lower the average price it will receive for 
them, as buyers demand a lemons discount.173 From the buyer’s 
perspective, pooling the assets into a single-tranche security (such as a 
pass-through MBS) mitigates this, as the risk of buying any particular 
bad asset decreases. This is disadvantageous to the intermediary, as the 
value of any private information it holds is done away with, taking away 
the seller’s option “regarding how aggressively to sell each asset.”174 
DeMarzo terms this the “information destruction effect.”  If the 
intermediary tranches the payouts from the asset pool, however, a 
countervailing “risk diversification effect” arises as buyers realize the 
senior tranche(s) will contain very little credit risk, since the lower 
tranches will absorb all losses in ordinary economic circumstances.175 
The risk diversification effect will dominate over the information 
destruction effect as the asset pool grows, and sellers can further signal 
their faith in the securities by retaining a portion of the lower tranche 
securities.176 The risk diversification effect is particularly strong where 
information the sponsor possesses is general to all assets in the pool, as 
opposed to knowledge specific to particular assets in the pool. 
DeMarzo’s model of “informed intermediation” therefore explains the 
ABS structure as a mechanism that overcomes the information 
asymmetry between sellers and buyers of discrete financial obligations 
which are difficult for buyers to properly evaluate.177 
More recent theoretical and empirical studies call into question the 
“informed intermediation” model, however. Reflecting on the inherent 
complexity of actual CDOs, a group of computer scientists and an 
economist from Princeton University theorize that if buyers actually 
possess limited computational ability to investigate the make-up of the 
assets placed in the asset pools, as is true of real-world investors, the use 
                                                                                                                                         
 172. See DeMarzo, supra note 27, at 2-3. In this paper, DeMarzo draws on his 
earlier work with Darrell Duffie, as well as the work of Leland & Pyle. See DeMarzo & 
Duffie, supra note 164; Leland & Pyle, supra note 164. 
 173. DeMarzo, supra note 27, at 2 (“given its superior information, the intermediary 
faces a ‘lemons’ problem when it attempts to resell the assets, resulting in illiquidity: 
the price the intermediary receives for the assets is decreasing in the quantity sold.”) 
 174. Id. at 3, 10. 
 175. See id. at 10-11. 
 176. Id. at 30. 
 177. Id. at 30-31. 
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of CDOs may actually increase lemons costs.178 Using concepts from 
computer science, in Computational Complexity and Information 
Asymmetry in Financial Products, Sanjeev Arora, Boaz Barak, Markus 
Brunnermeier & Rong Ge argue that it is impossible for computationally 
limited buyers to detect when CDO sellers “cherry pick” inferior assets 
to place in the asset pools.179 Assuming sellers are constructing multiple 
CDOs, and can select the assets most likely to default from a larger 
potential asset pool, the assets actually selected will create a “dense 
subgraph” of connection points. Arora et al. begin by drawing a 
“bipartite graph” to map out the relation between a set of tranched 
securities and a set of assets:180 
 





. . . . . . . .   . 
 
Arora, et al., Figure 1 
In this bipartite graph, the top row represents M vertices 
corresponding to the individual CDOs, and the bottom row represents N 
vertices corresponding to the assets. The lines connecting them represent 
the reference of an asset (or inclusion in a collateral pool) by a CDO. 
In a bipartite graph, a “dense subgraph” occurs where there is a 
higher-than-usual amount of nodal pairs or “edges.”181 A nodal pair 
represents a connection between the top line of the bipartite graph, 
representing an individual CDO along a line of CDOs, and a particular 
asset class (with a value known to the seller but not the buyer) on the 
bottom line of the graph; and so an edge indicates the selection of an 
asset for a CDO’s asset pool. When assets are selected at random from 
                                                                                                                                         
 178. Sanjeev Arora, Boaz Barak, Markus Brunnermeier & Rong Ge, Computational 
Complexity and Information Asymmetry in Financial Products (Working Paper, Oct. 
19, 2009), available at http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~rongge/derivative.pdf. 
 179. Id. at 3. 
 180. Id. at 8. 
 181. Dense subgraphs can arise at random, but they will not occur with high 
probability. Id. at 9. 
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the larger set of possible assets, dense subgraphs may arise at random, 
but in cases of cherry-picking of assets from certain asset classes, such 
dense subgraphs will arise much more frequently. Arora et al. go on to 
demonstrate that buyers with “exponential” time to investigate the assets 
placed in asset pools will be able to discover the resulting dense 
subgraphs, but buyers with limited “polynomial” computational abilities 
will find the problem of uncovering these dense subgraphs 
computationally intractable: A fully rational, or unbounded, mind would 
be able to investigate all possible subsets of assets in a particular 
structured finance security to make sure that none were overrepresented 
in the collateral pool, which would indicate cherry-picking on the part of 
the seller.182 A buyer on the other hand “restricted to feasible (i.e. 
polynomial time) computation . . . cannot verify that the CDO was 
properly constructed.”183 
If Arora and his colleagues are correct, because real-world CDO 
investors are restricted in their computational abilities, CDOs allow their 
creators to select cheaper, lower quality assets as collateral, all the while 
hiding behind the inherent complexity of the structured finance vehicle. 
If CDO sponsors actually use them for this purpose, CDOs will in fact 
increase, not decrease, lemons costs, contra DeMarzo.184 Such a result is 
a manifestation of investors’ bounded rationality, here seen in the 
inability of even sophisticated investors to carry out the computations 
necessary to uncover cherry-picking. 
In addition to the theoretical reconsideration of whether the ABS 
model reduces lemons costs, there is also recent empirical evidence that 
MBSs in fact do add lemons costs. In Is the Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Market a Market for Lemons?, financial economists Chris Downing, 
Dwight Jaffee and Nancy Wallace studied Freddie Mac Gold 
Participation Certificates (“PCs”), MBSs backed by mortgages 
guaranteed by the government-sponsored Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae.185 The PCs are MBSs that contain between 25 and 125 
                                                                                                                                         
 182. Id. at 4. 
 183. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). 
 184. Note that Arora et al. discuss DeMarzo’s theory of informed intermediation, 
stating that in the case where an intermediary was selling only a single security, as 
opposed to many, and the buyer possessed the ability to perform exponential time 
computations, the tranched security would in fact reduce the costs of asymmetrical 
information. See id. at 7. 
 185. Chris Downing, Dwight Jaffee & Nancy Wallace, Is the Market for Mortgage-
Backed Securities a Market for Lemons?, 22(7) REV. FIN. STUD. 2457 (2009).  
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mortgages.186 PCs are assembled by mortgage originators, who bundle 
the mortgages together into single-tranche MBSs and then obtain CUSIP 
numbers for the securities.187 Since mortgage originators possess 
extensive knowledge concerning the individual borrowers which buyers 
of the PCs do not, including factors indicating whether or not they are 
likely to efficiently (from the borrower’s perspective) pre-pay the 
mortgage, there is an important information asymmetry present; in the 
event borrowers prepay, investors realize lower returns. After the PCs 
are formed, they can either be held by the originators or sold to other 
investors for use as collateral in tranched MBSs known as REMICs (real 
estate mortgage investment conduits).188 Sales occur in the “to be 
announced” market, where the PCs to be delivered to purchasers are 
specified solely in terms of their average maturity and coupon of the 
underlying mortgages; some of the PCs purchased by investors are then 
repackaged into REMICs. By comparing price data from 1992 to 2002 
on the PCs that were repackaged into REMICs and those that were not, 
Downing et al. found that PCs sold were priced in the range of $0.27 to 
$0.55, or an average of $0.39 less per $100.00 of principal than those 
not sold.189 The authors interpret this as evidence of a lemons market: 
PC buyers knew that the sellers possessed information concerning the 
underlying mortgages that was not available to them, so buyers expected 
delivery of the lower-quality mortgages (which from the lenders’ 
standpoint were ones that would not be refinanced efficiently) and they 
priced their bids accordingly.190 
                                                                                                                                         
 186. Id. at 2462. 
 187. Id.  A security’s “CUSIP” number refers to its 9-digit alphanumeric code used 
for clearing securities transactions in North America. The acronym “CUSIP” stands for 
the Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures.  
 188. Id. at 2458. 
 189. Id. at 2487. 
 190. See id. at 2458. Supporting this conclusion is evidence that MBS underwriters 
exploited inside information when trading on their MBSs in the secondary markets. See 
Steven Drucker & Christopher Mayer, Private Information and Market Making in 
Secondary Mortgage Markets (Working Paper, Jan. 6, 2008), available at http://www4. 
gsb.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=16547; see 
also Benjamin J. Keys, Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, Did 
Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence From Subprime Loans, 125 Q. J. 
ECONOMICS 307 (2010) (finding that “[c]onditional on being securitized, the portfolio 
with greater ease of securitization defaults by about 10-25% more than a similar risk 
profile group with a lower probability of securitization.”). 
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What significance do these reconsiderations of the pre-crisis 
explanations of structured finance securities have for the story of ratings 
failure? First, it is important to note that the position of Downing et al. is 
only a development of DeMarzo’s theory. In positing that pooling and 
tranching is a mechanism to overcome a lemons problem, DeMarzo still 
begins from the fact that a lemons problem is central to the existence of 
CDOs. Nonetheless, his theory is optimistic in the sense that he sees the 
risk diversification effect as triumphing over the information destruction 
effect. Downing et al. can be seen as on the one hand merely developing 
this analysis by documenting the defects in the underlying collateral and 
demonstrating empirically that buyers perceive a risk in the mortgage 
pools that are offered for sale. On the other hand, by focusing on lemons 
costs that persist, Downing et al. draw attention to the defects in the 
underlying collateral. As discussed above, collateral quality deteriorated 
sharply as the housing boom matured.191 Buyers should have been 
skeptical of the goods on sale. The buyers in Downing et al.’s study 
were structured finance insiders, though, and the data studied was from 
1992 to 2002. 
In Downing et al.’s perspective there is a substantial lemons 
problem, and in the more radical perspective of Arora et al. there is an 
overwhelming one, on the level of the CDO itself. The CDO exacerbates 
an already-existing information asymmetry by allowing sponsors to 
unload faulty collateral. Since buyers do not possess detailed 
information on each asset in the asset pool, practically speaking they 
cannot independently assess the creditworthiness of the asset pools. (It 
even appears that the CRAs themselves often did not have access to the 
underlying loan data on the mortgages bundled into RMBSs that were 
then re-securitized in CDOs.192) And even if purchasers possessed such 
information, in Arora et al.’s model, they could not determine whether 
the sponsors had purposefully chosen lesser quality assets from the 
entire universe of possible assets. While Downing et al. present evidence 
that certain Freddie Mac-backed MBSs already embodied a lemons cost, 
more research remains to be done on whether other structured finance 
securities include such a cost. In Akerlof’s model of a lemons market, as 
                                                                                                                                         
 191. See supra Parts I.C.1, I.D.1. 
 192. Consider, for example, the well-known anecdote of Frank Raiter, a S&P 
employee who was told by his supervisor, Richard Gugliada, that his request to see the 
underlying loan information on the collateral in a CDO was “totally unreasonable!!!” 
Gretchen Morgenson, House Panel Scrutinizes Rating Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2008, at B1. 
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well as that of DeMarzo and Downing et al., lemons-costs arise when 
buyers and sellers possess unequal information about assets, and buyers 
are aware of this information asymmetry and demand an appropriate 
lemons discount. 
The implications of Arora et al.’s paper are more radical: if we 
consider the general world of investors purchasing structured finance 
securities, who, unlike the purchasers of Freddie Mac PCs in Downing 
et al.’s paper, were not structured finance or real estate insiders, there is 
no intimation they suspected they were buying securities whose asset 
pools contained a large amount of default-prone assets. On the level of 
CDOs as a general asset class, it is now obvious that real estate-backed 
CDOs were lemons, but before the credit crisis they were lemons in 
disguise, so to speak. Buyers of these CDOs should have demanded a 
significant lemons discount, but they were unaware of the substantial 
information asymmetry embedded in them and failed to realize the 
opportunities for mischief that CDOs offered their sponsors. A partial 
explanation for the credit crisis then is the shock to the financial system 
as parties holding real estate-backed CDOs became aware of the 
informational flaws embedded within them. 
 
2. Practical Implication: The Current Market  
for Structured Finance Securities 
 
Turning to the financial markets in the wake of the crash, is there 
evidence that ABS CDOs were lemons in disguise? If investors were 
originally unaware of their flaws, after such information becomes 
widely disseminated, buyers should either demand an appropriate 
lemons discount for the class of securities containing a certain amount 
of lemons, or, if the price including the lemons discount falls below 
what sellers are willing to offer the securities at, trade will cease. 
Current evidence from the structured finance markets193 supports the 
following propositions: 1) Real estate-backed ABS CDOs were so 
fundamentally flawed that no market in them will continue to function 
now that investors have become aware of their flaws. This means that 
the degree of ratings arbitrage, miscalculation of correlation and/or 
mortgage fraud in the collateral underlying real estate-backed CDOs 
was either so great that the economic benefits to sponsors and other 
supply-side market participants from these flaws were either the sole or 
                                                                                                                                         
 193. See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text. 
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the dominant explanation for their existence, or the crash in value has 
made investors so skittish that they are not willing to even bid in the 
market for new real estate-backed CDOs. 2) Ratings arbitrage, however, 
does not explain the existence of structured finance securities in general, 
as certain areas of the structured finance markets continue to function, 
despite the radical drop-off in global CDO issuance as illustrated below. 
The three traditional accounts for pooling and tranching reviewed by 
DeMarzo then appear to possess some explanatory power, with 
structured finance securities accomplishing one or more of the following 
tasks: allowing access to markets, overcoming transaction costs or 
overcoming information asymmetries.194 With phenomena as complex 
as structured finance securities, it may be the case that they accomplish 
multiple goals for market participants, at the same time that in the case 
of real estate-backed ABS CDOs, sponsors were able to game the rating 
system and exploit other weaknesses to such a degree that a fourth 
explanation, ratings arbitrage (and other forms of activity benefiting 
parties involved in the construction of CDOs, to the detriment of 
investors), swamped the effects of the first three with respect to this 
specific category of ABS. 
Almost three years after the onset of the credit crisis, the issuance 
of structured finance securities outside of ABS securities of 
government-backed mortgages is miniscule compared to the amounts 
that flooded the market in the boom years of 2004-2007. Global CDO 
issuance is captured in the following chart of SIMFA data: 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 194. See DeMarzo, supra note 27, at 2. 
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Global CDO Issuance, in Billions of US Dollars 
Source: SIFMA Global CDO Issuance195 
 
This chart illustrates that while not completely extinct, global CDO 
issuance of $7.68 billion in 2010 is a mere 1.4% of the $520.64 billion 
issued in 2006 when the market peaked. Of course it should be 
remembered that the term “CDO” here is used in its narrower meaning, 
signifying just a structured finance securitization that holds other 
structured finance securities (ABSs), CDSs (synthetic CDOs) or assets 
such as corporate loans or bonds.196 Most importantly, global CDO 
issuance does not include first-tier securitizations of mortgages, either 
government-backed or ‘private label’ securities. 
CDO issuance is therefore nearly, though not entirely, extinct.197 
Asset-backed securitization on the other hand exists at significant levels 
                                                                                                                                         
 195. SIFMA compiles data on activity in the financial markets. Data is available at 
www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx. 
 196. See Global CDO Issuance tbl. 1.4, SIFMA, www.sifma.org/research/ 
statistics.aspx (Global CDO Issuance – Collateral). Collateral includes high-yield 
bonds, high-yield loans, investment grade bonds, mixed collateral, other, other swaps 
and structured finance, www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (last visited March 31, 
2012). 
 197. For more detail on the current CDO marketplace, see Katy Burne, Global 
Finance: With a Deal From UBS, Signs of Life in Synthetic CDOs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
26, 2010, at C3, and Ruth Simon, Return of the ‘Private Label’—Market for 
Nontraditional Mortgage Securities Stirs, but Don’t Call It a Revival, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
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in the marketplace, though at steep dropoffs from the 2005-2007 period. 
SIFMA reports that total U.S. ABS issuance stood at $107.49 billion in 
2010, down from $753.87 billion in the peak year of 2006, or 14.2% of 
the 2006 amount.198 Of the 2010 collateral subcategories, auto loans 
stood at $57.86 billion, student loans at $17.72 billion, with credit cards, 
equipment loans and other loans making up the rest; home equity loans 
contributed only $3.51 billion or 3.26% of the total.199 In 2006, by 
contrast, home equity amounted to 64.19% or $483.91 billion of the 
ABS collateral. 
Separate from ABSs in the SIFMA reporting categories are MBSs, 
including securities backed by GNMA and FNMA loans, CMOs and 
non-government backed private label securities including both CMBSs 
and RMBSs. Here, issuance of government agency-backed MBSs has 
actually exploded in the wake of the recession, with $2.02 trillion in 
agency MBSs issued in 2009 and $1.92 trillion in 2010, up from $1.24 
trillion in 2006.200 After the financial crisis, investor interest in private-
label MBSs is low; from a peak of $909.40 billion in 2006 (and $765.9 
billion in 2007), private-label MBS issuance collapsed to $18.10 billion 
in 2009 (a stunning 98.01% decrease!), recovering to $34.60 billion in 
2010.201 
These figures illustrate that securitization of U.S. real estate 
obligations not backed up by the U.S. government is far below its peak, 
and the more complex securities, CDOs, have nearly vanished. 
Conversely, categories of ABS not tied to real estate are still significant, 
though down considerably. Investors are obviously scared away from 
the categories of investments that caused so much carnage in the 
collapse, but healthy areas of securitization remain. Additional 
confirmation of the continued viability of securitization comes from 
SIFMA’s “European Securitisation Issuance” chart.202 Total European 
securitizations stood at $514.92 billion for 2010, down only slightly 
from the 2006 level of $566.36 billion though under half of the 2008 
                                                                                                                                         
 198. See U.S. ABS Issuance and Outstanding, SIFMA, www.sifma.org/research/ 
statistics.aspx. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See U.S. Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities Issuance and Outstanding, 
SIFMA, www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx. 
 201. See U.S. Mortgage-Related Issuance, SIFMA, www.sifma.org/research/stat 
istics.aspx. 
 202. See Europe Structured Finance Issuance and Outstanding, SIFMA www.sifma. 
org/research/statistics.aspx. 
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peak of $1.095 trillion.203 RMBSs stood at $367.92 billion, down from 
2008’s $790.74 billion.204 
What conclusions does this economic data point to? First, at least 
investors in U.S. securities do not trust real estate-backed securitizations 
not backed by the U.S. government. While other explanations are 
possible, such as the continued uncertainty about the proper prices of 
U.S. real estate and the health of the American economy in the near, 
medium and long terms, it is probable that investors mistrust the rating 
agencies that rated such debt and the sponsors and collateral managers 
purchasing collateral. The practices of ratings arbitrage and stuffing 
collateral pools with poor quality mortgages appear to have shuttered 
these markets. That said, the fact that securitization markets continue to 
function at significant levels indicates that ratings arbitrage wasn’t the 
sole purpose of securitization. The misdeeds and mistakes of the past 
decade were manipulations of a very complex system that caused it to 
crash, but they appear to have been parasitic growths upon an already 
malfunctioning securitization market rather than its very raison d’etre.205  
 
 
II. THE RESPONSE: “IMPROVEMENTS TO THE 
   REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES” 
 
Given the huge losses in the U.S. and global economies as a result 
of the collapse of the housing bubble, flawed ratings came in for severe 
criticism as soon as the crisis began to unfold.206 Reform at the CRAs 
therefore became one of the central objectives of the drafters of the 
financial reform legislation in 2009. Ironically, while inflated ratings 
were a necessary if not sufficient cause of the credit crisis, a ratings 
                                                                                                                                         
 203. See id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. For a discussion of the commercial mortgage-backed securities market, and 
how investor behavior there may differ from other structured finance markets, see 
Robert A. Brown, Financial Reform and the Subsidization of Sophisticated Investors’ 
Ignorance in Securitization Markets, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 105 (2010). 
 206. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, Bond Raters Make Effort to Repair 
Credibility, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2008, at C1; Gretchen Morgenson, Debt Watchdogs: 
Tamed or Caught Napping?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at A1; Arthur Levitt, Jr., 
Conflicts and the Credit Crunch, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2007, at A15; Kara Scannell & 
Aaron Lucchetti, Crisis on Wall Street: SEC Tightens Rules for Ratings Firms, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 4, 2008, at C3. 
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reform bill had just been passed in 2006 in the wake of Enron’s collapse 
and other accounting scandals of the early 2000s, when the agencies had 
maintained investment grade ratings on Enron debt until days before its 
bankruptcy.207 The “Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006” 
(“CRARA”), 208 which added Section 15E (“Registration of Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations”) to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, was meant to improve the ratings system 
primarily by regularizing the process of becoming a NRSRO, and 
thereby spurring competition in the ratings industry.209 CRARA also 
prohibited some of the more objectionable practices of the rating 
agencies, such as threatening to retaliate against issuers that did not use 
an agency for an issuance by downgrading other securities of that issuer, 
but it did not mandate fundamental change. Congress drew the line at 
regulating the actual methods used by agency analysts to rate securities, 
forbidding the SEC from regulating “the substance of credit ratings or 
the procedures and methodologies by which any NRSRO determines 
credit ratings,”210 and likewise refused to consider any legislative 
mandates that would offer fundamental reordering of the credit rating 
industry or its business model. 
Despite the national trauma of Enron, Worldcom and the other 
accounting scandals that led to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and 
CRARA, the consequences of the second wave of ratings failures in 
2007-2008 were much more severe and the root causes much more 
complex. As argued in the previous section, activity in the current 
structured finance markets leads to the conclusion that multiple 
explanations for the existence of CDOs are likely to be valid, with 
ratings arbitrage dominating in CDOs backed by RMBSs, and the pre-
crisis, conventional explanations holding sway in other areas of 
structured finance where activity remains at significant, albeit reduced, 
levels.211 Congress consequently faced a considerably more difficult task 
                                                                                                                                         
 207. See Arthur Levitt, Jr., Conflicts and the Credit Crunch, supra note 206, at A15.  
 208. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 
(2006) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2) (2006)) (adding Section 15E to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 209. The preamble to CRARA states that it is “[a]n Act . . . [t]o improve ratings 
quality for the protection of investors and in the public interest by fostering 
accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating agency industry.” 
Preamble of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act. 
 210. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2). 
 211. See supra Part I.E.2, text accompanying notes 195-204. 
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in 2009 when it returned to the issue of credit ratings, that of providing 
regulation to a hyper-complex system which very few individuals, 
including many with considerable financial experience, really 
understood, and which possessed the power to cast the U.S. economy 
into severe recession or even depression in the event of sustained 
malfunction. The result of Congress’s efforts is Title IX, Subtitle C of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, “Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Rating 
Agencies.”212 Part II provides an overview of IRCRA, focusing on 
provisions responding to the failures outlined in Part I.C above, and 
concludes with some reflections on the wider significance of the 
regulatory strategies IRCRA adopts. 
While IRCRA goes further than CRARA in many important 
respects, like CRARA it does not fundamentally change the nature of 
the ratings industry, although the studies and proposals it requires of the 
SEC and the Government Accounting Office have the potential to do so 
should they lead to changes in the law. Instead of a fundamental 
reordering, at this point IRCRA should be seen as a further step along 
the road of oversight of the agencies. Indeed, its most important 
provisions do not even apply to the rating agencies directly: Section 939 
removes references to credit ratings issued by NRSROs from six major 
provisions of federal financial law, and Section 939A calls for every 
federal agency to review its regulations and substitute its own standards 
of credit-worthiness for references to “credit ratings” within a year.213 
Should these provisions be definitively implemented, the resulting shift 
in the regulatory landscape will deprive the rating agencies of their 
ability to profit by granting “regulatory licenses,” approvals necessary 
for issuers to sell debt securities that can be held by a wide range of 
investors, such as pension and mutual funds. It is also important the 
IRCRA does not attempt a direct assault on the root cause of ratings 
failure, the quantitative models that produced flawed ratings. 
The mandates applicable to the rating agencies fall into three 
general categories: 1) Management of conflicts of interest; 2) enhanced 
disclosure; and 3) increased exposure to litigation risk. Part II reviews 
them in turn. 
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A. MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
It is clear that the drafters of Dodd-Frank believed conflicts were 
central to the problems of the rating agencies, as the statement of 
Congressional findings at the beginning of Subtitle C includes them, and  
Subtitle C ends with a declaration that the SEC should do more to 
control them.  Section 931(4), which details Congress’s findings, states 
that: 
In certain activities, particularly in advising arrangers of structured 
financial products on potential ratings of such products, credit rating 
agencies face conflicts of interest that need to be carefully monitored 
and that therefore should be addressed explicitly in legislation in 
order to give clearer authority to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.214 
And the final section of IRCRA, section 939H, “Sense of 
Congress,” states that: 
It is the sense of Congress that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission should exercise the rulemaking authority of the 
Commission under section 15E(h)(2)(B) of the Securities Exhange 
Act of 1934 . . . to prevent improper conflicts of interest arising from 
employees of nationally recognized statistical rating organizations 
providing services to issuers of securities that are unrelated to the 
issuance of credit ratings, including consulting, advisory, and other 
services.215 
The Dodd-Frank Act therefore attempts to police conflicts at the 
rating agencies in an effort to eliminate the conflicts that contributed to 
the issuance of flawed ratings. The most important of the conflicts 
provisions are contained in Section 932, “Enhanced Regulation, 
Accountability, and Transparency of Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations.”216 
First, Section 932(a)(4) mandates the separation of ratings activities 
from sales and marketing activities undertaken by a NRSRO. The SEC 
is required to “issue rules to prevent the sales and marketing 
considerations of a nationally recognized statistical rating organization 
from influencing the product of ratings by the nationally recognized 
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 215. Id. § 939H. 
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statistical rating organization.”217 These rules are intended to separate 
the business services provided by a “gatekeeper” from its necessary 
marketing efforts as an independent organization in a free-market 
environment, and are a response to a number of instances of marketing 
concerns influencing decisions concerning ratings of structured finance 
securities, as detailed in the SEC’s 2008 Summary Report.218 
In addition to sales considerations influencing the ratings process, 
IRCRA also takes aim at conflicts of interest arising from the desire of 
rating agency employees to attain potentially much more lucrative 
positions with issuers and certain other financial markets employers. 
Section 932(a)(4)’s “look-back requirement” mandates that in the event 
that any employee of a NRSRO leaves for employment with an “issuer, 
underwriter, or sponsor of a security or money market instrument” 
subject to a credit rating by the NRSRO, the NRSRO must review 
whether any conflict of interest influenced the rating, and revise such 
rating in the event that there was a conflict.219 Furthermore, Section 932 
adds Section 5 to 15E(h), requiring NRSROs to report to the SEC on 
certain employees obtaining employment with “any obligor, issuer, 
underwriter, or sponsor of a security or money market instrument” for 
whom the NRSRO has issued a credit rating in the past year.220 This new 
reporting requirement includes all employees within the past five years 
who directly participated in determining credit ratings for their new 
employers, those who supervised employees who did so and all senior 
officers. These employment-related provisions respond to the reports of 
numerous rating agency analysts leaving for much more highly 
compensated positions with other financial institutions, and the 
pressures and temptations facing those working for the rating 
agencies.221 The look-back provision of new Section 15E(h)(4) also 
mandates SEC review of NRSRO compliance with the look-back 
requirement, as well as annual reviews of the codes of ethics and 
conflicts of interest policies of the NRSROs.222 
New Section (p) of 15E establishes an “Office of Credit Ratings” 
within the SEC which has among its many duties an obligation to 
                                                                                                                                         
 217. Id. § 932(a)(4) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(3)(A)). 
 218. SEC 2008 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 51, at 23-29. 
 219. Dodd-Frank Act § 932(a)(4) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(4)(A)). 
 220. Id. § 932(a)(4) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(5)(A)). 
 221. See Lucchetti, supra note 84, at A1; Storey, supra note 150, at A1. 
 222. Dodd-Frank Act § 932(a)(4) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(4)(B)). 
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actively monitor conflicts of interest: included within the items required 
for the annual review of each NRSRO is “the management of conflicts 
of interest” by the NRSRO.223 The Commission is also charged with 
issuing new rules mandating disclosure concerning the transparency of 
ratings performance,224 including a rule requiring that an NRSRO 
include “an attestation with any credit rating it issues affirming that no 
part of the rating was influenced by any other business activities, that 
the rating was based solely on the merits of the instruments being rated, 
and that such rating was an independent evaluation of the risks and 
merits of the instrument.”225 Finally, new Section (s) requires each 
NRSRO to disclose on a new form accompanying each credit rating 
“information relating to conflicts of interest” of the particular 
NRSRO.226 
All the above provisions relate to disclosure of information 
concerning conflicts of interest, both to users of credit ratings and to the 
SEC. Like Sarbanes-Oxley, IRCRA also includes new mandates 
concerning corporate governance at the ratings agencies, which attempt 
to instill independence at the rating agency level itself. New Section (t), 
“Corporate Governance, Organization, and Management of Conflicts of 
Interest,” requires that at least one half of the board of directors of an 
NRSRO be independent, and that a user of ratings is included among the 
independent board members.227 In addition, the compensation of board 
members is not to “be linked to the business performance of the” 
NRSRO, and among the prescribed duties of the board is “the 
establishment, maintenance and enforcement of policies and procedures 
to address, manage, and disclose any conflicts of interest[.]”228 
Section 932 then contains the new disclosure and governance 
provisions which are meant to police conflicts of interest at the CRAs. 
These provisions employ a common strategy of U.S. securities law, by 
mandating disclosure in the belief that investors and others in the 
financial markets can make their own investment decisions based upon 
the information revealed to them, as well as the more aggressive tactic 
of Sarbanes-Oxley, by actively interfering in the internal corporate 
                                                                                                                                         
 223. Id. § 932(a)(8) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(p)). 
 224. Id. § 932 (a)(8) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(q)(1)).  
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governance of the CRAs.229 Three additional provisions concerning 
conflicts of interest are important to note. Sections 939C, 939D and 
939F all mandate studies of possible alternative ways of providing credit 
information to the markets which had been discussed and proposed in 
the run-up to the passage of Dodd-Frank.230 Section 939C requires the 
SEC to study the independence of the CRAs and how independence, or 
the lack of it, affects the CRAs’ performance. The SEC is to report its 
findings to Congress within three years, along with any 
recommendations for improving the integrity of ratings. Section 939D 
requires the Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) to study 
alternative means of compensating the CRAs for their services and to 
report back to Congress within 18 months.231 The GAO study is meant 
to explore alternatives to the “issuer pays” business model, the most 
glaring example of a conflict of interest in the current ratings system.232 
Finally, Section 939F requires, among other things, the SEC to study 
“the feasibility of establishing a system in which a public or private 
utility or a self-regulatory organization assigns” ratings to the individual 
NRSROs.233 This is the descendant of the “Franken Amendment” 
proposed by Senator Al Franken which would have established such a 
ratings assignment system.234 This report is due within two years of 
Dodd-Frank’s passage. If such a system was to be adopted, it would 
obviously have major effects on the provision of credit ratings; however, 
the feasibility of such a system is open to question.235 
                                                                                                                                         
 229. Disclosure as a central focus of U.S. securities law is expressed in the Supreme 
Court’s statement that the fundamental purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
is to implement a “philosophy of full disclosure.” Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 
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Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329 (1988). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2003 represents a 
significant federalization of the law governing corporate entities. See, e.g., Roberta S. 
Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and Exchange 
Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005). 
 230. See, e.g., Aline van Duyn, Dilemmas of reforming the rating agencies, FIN. 
TIMES, June 11, 2010, at 23; Levitt, supra note 207; Mendales, supra note 19. 
 231. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9, Note; Dodd-Frank Act § 939D. 
 232. See Lynn Bai, On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating 
Industry, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 261 (2010). 
 233. Dodd-Frank Act § 939F. 
 234. See Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 54, at 32. 
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This review of IRCRA’s provisions relating to conflicts of interest 
shows that reducing their effects was a central goal of the legislation.236  
Given the analysis of flawed ratings presented in Parts I.C and I.D 
above, however, management of conflicts of interest will likely not be 
sufficient to prevent ratings failure in the future, as conflicts of interest 
were not the primary cause of the ratings disaster. Proper response to 
conflicts of interest will have significant beneficial effects, though, 
helping insulate the CRAs from improper responses to technical 
problems that arise in complex ratings systems, and incentivizing the 
production of objective ratings in the first place. 
B. NEW DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
As disclosure is a pillar of U.S. securities regulation, it is not 
surprising that IRCRA contains numerous new disclosure requirements 
concerning the ratings process, in addition to the new disclosure 
requirements for asset-backed securities contained in Subtitle D of Title 
IX of Dodd-Frank, “Improvements to the Asset-Backed Securitization 
Process.”237 The fundamental premise behind the new requirements is 
the rationale for disclosure requirements in general: investors and users 
of ratings are sophisticated actors, and requiring issuers, or in this case, 
issuers of credit ratings, to disclose crucial information concerning the 
security that investors are contemplating purchasing, or the rating they 
may rely on, is essential to the efficient functioning of the financial 
markets. As long as issuers and ratings agencies provide the required 
information, and that information is truthful and complete, the 
responsibility shifts to the potential investor to evaluate it. The conflict 
of interest provisions requiring disclosure are set in the larger context of 
the following general disclosure requirements. 
1. Office of Credit Ratings Annual Reports on NRSROs 
 
New subsection (p) of 15E requires that the newly created Office of 
Credit Ratings (“OCR”) within the SEC conduct yearly examinations of 
each NRSRO.238 These examinations cover a number of facets of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 236. Professor Coffee notes that the Dodd-Frank Act “straddles the gap” between 
reducing conflicts of interest and reducing the reliance of federal financial regulation on 
credit ratings as two primary avenues of reform. See id. at 3. 
 237. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 941-946. 
 238. Id. § 932(a)(8) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(p)). 
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rating agency’s operations, including whether it is conducting business 
according to its stated policies, procedures and ratings methodologies; 
implementation of its ethics policy; corporate governance; the 
management of conflicts of interest; and internal supervisory controls, 
among other things.239 New section 15E(p)(3)(C) requires that the OCR 
issue an annual report to the public summarizing the findings of the 
examinations conducted, any response from the NRSRO concerning any 
material deficiency identified, and whether the NRSRO has addressed 
any deficiencies identified in previous annual examinations.240 
2. Transparency of Ratings Performance 
New rule 15E(q), “Transparency of Ratings Performance,” requires 
each NRSRO to issue detailed public disclosure concerning each 
obligor, security and money market instrument it rates, as well as all 
subsequent changes to those ratings.241 Rules issued by the SEC shall 
require that disclosures are comparable across NRSROs to ensure 
comparability; are clear enough to be used by investors with varying 
degrees of sophistication; include performance information from a wide 
variety of types of credit ratings, including ratings that have been 
withdrawn; and be published on the NRSRO’s website as well as made 
available in writing.242 Furthermore, each credit rating will now be 
required to include an attestation affirming that the rating was not 
influenced by other business activities of the NRSRO, that it was based 
solely on the merits of the instrument rated, and that it was an 
independent evaluation of such instrument.243 
3. Disclosure of Changes in Ratings Methodologies 
New Section 15E(r) requires the SEC to promulgate rules 
concerning the methodologies NRSROs use to rate securities.244 These 
new rules however will simply require approval by the board of 
directors of the ratings methods used by a NRSRO and that they be 
compatible with the stated policies of the NRSRO. Exchange Act 
                                                                                                                                         
 239. Id. § 932(a)(8) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(p)(3)(B)). 
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Section 15E(c)(2) remains in force, and the SEC does not have the 
power to actually dictate the “substance of credit ratings” or the 
methodologies used to generate them. NRSROs must also disclose to 
ratings information users the method used to generate any ratings, 
material changes to ratings methodologies, and discoveries of significant 
errors in a procedure or methodology or when a material change to a 
procedure or methodology is likely.245 This provision responds to a well-
publicized incident concerning an error in the computer codes used by 
Moody’s to rate a very sophisticated type of CDO, the constant 
proportion debt obligation or “CPDO.”246 Upon discovering the error, 
Moody’s changed the ratings procedure on a going-forward basis, 
without however adjusting the flawed ratings already issued. 
 
4. Transparency of Credit Ratings  
Methodologies and Information Reviewed 
 
New section 15E(s) requires that each NRSRO issue a form with 
each credit rating which provides key information behind the rating and 
how it was produced, i.e, “the assumptions underlying the credit rating 
procedures and methodologies” and “the data relied on” to produce the 
rating.247 The format and content of the information report track closely 
central concerns with ratings of structured finance securities. First, in 
addition to being “easy to use and helpful,” the form must present its 
content “in a manner that is directly comparable across types of 
securities.”248 This requirement speaks to the well-documented 
realization that identical credit ratings implied different default rates 
with different categories of securities. In the phenomena of “ratings 
drift,” a specified rating for a CDO tranche had a higher default 
probability than a corporate debt security of the same rating, which in 
turn had a higher default probability than a first-tier structured finance 
security of the same rating.249 By requiring ratings symbols to be 
directly comparable, Congress is attempting to shut down one of the key 
flaws in the ratings system for structured finance securities that both led 
                                                                                                                                         
 245. Id. § 932(a)(8) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(r)(3)). 
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users of ratings to underestimate the risk involved in complex securities 
and, more perniciously, allowed sponsors to arbitrage the ratings system. 
In addition to the new disclosure form, IRCRA Section 938, “Universal 
Ratings Symbols,” prohibits the use of the same rating symbols with 
different types of securities where different default probabilities 
apply.250 The SEC must promulgate rules requiring that CRAs apply any 
ratings symbol “in a manner that is consistent for all types of securities 
and money market instruments for which the symbol is used.”251 
New section 15E(s) also requires disclosure of key qualitative 
factors behind a rating. “[T]he main assumptions and principles used in 
constructing procedures and methodologies” must now be disclosed, 
“including qualitative methodologies and quantitative inputs and 
assumptions about the correlation of defaults across underlying assets 
used in rating structured products.”252 As discussed above, wildly 
inaccurate correlation figures were essential to the ratings process.253 
NRSROs must also list the potential limitations of their ratings and the 
risks they did not consider in producing a rating,254 disclose information 
concerning the uncertainty of a rating, including the reliability, accuracy 
and quality of the data relied on, and discuss the limits and reliability of 
historical data and the NRSRO’s ability to access documents and other 
information that would produce a better credit rating.255 These 
requirements obviously respond to failures in the data relied on to 
produce correlation figures used in structured finance ratings—because 
actual data on defaults of mortgages was not available, correlation 
equations acted as a substitute credit default swap prices on RMBSs. 
However, since these prices were only available from the past two 
decades, during times of rising home prices, default potentials were 
masked.256 
Third, new Section 15E(s)(3)(A)(v) requires information 
concerning the use of due diligence services by NRSROs, and Section 
15E(s)(4) requires issuers and underwriters to make such information 
publicly available and require the due diligence service provider to 
certify that it has “conducted a thorough review of the data, 
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documentation and other relevant information necessary” to produce an 
accurate credit rating.257 This requirement responds to the well-
documented lack of investigation of the creditworthiness of the assets 
underlying many real estate-backed structured finance securities and the 
lack of interest many investment banks and CRAs had in actually 
conducting such investigations.258 Finally, a NRSRO must provide an 
explanation of measure of the potential volatility of a rating, information 
on the historical performance of the rating and its expected default 
probability, as well as the sensitivity of the rating to the assumptions 
made by the NRSRO in producing it.259 
In sum, new Section 15E(s) is a critical element of IRCRA, as it 
requires disclosure of information concerning many of the key 
categories of data that are now recognized to have been at the root of the 
flawed ratings system. Arguably, had such information been available to 
investors in structured finance securities many would have been much 
more wary of them, assuming they would, and could, incorporate such 
data into their decision-making. 
C. THE LITIGATION LANDSCAPE 
The third arrow in IRCRA’s quiver is the modification of the 
liability the CRAs face concerning claims brought by private plaintiffs 
under federal securities laws. While IRCRA makes a number of 
important changes to the legal landscape, its effects are still uncertain in 
some areas and likely to be equivocal in others. Professor John Coffee, 
who was involved in drafting Section 933 of IRCRA, “State of Mind in 
Private Actions,” indicates that while new Section 21D(b)(2) of the 
Exchange Act lowers the pleading requirements with respect to scienter 
for plaintiffs filing securities claims against the CRAs, the provision’s 
ultimate purpose is to encourage greater due diligence by CRAs, not to 
expose them to claims related to their structured finance activities that 
could result in crippling damages.260 The overall thrust of IRCRA with 
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regard to litigation therefore is complex; evaluation of the new 
landscape must take into account the existing provisions of federal 
securities law and the institutional context of the structured finance 
markets, as well as the possible final line of defense, the protection 
offered to the CRAs under the First Amendment as issuers of 
“opinions.” Part II.C.1 first reviews the basic framework of laws the 
CRAs operated in prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, and Part II.C.2 outlines 
the changes IRCRA makes to this framework. 
1. The Pre-Existing Legal Framework 
The CRAs have proven remarkably resistant to legal attacks 
relating to their role in the subprime crisis. While numerous lawsuits 
have been launched against them, and cracks have appeared in their First 
Amendment defense, as of the time of this writing there have been no 
judgments against them for their conduct in issuing structured finance 
ratings. Their ability to avoid liability rests on a few key provisions of 
federal law, as well as the difficulty of bringing state law claims for 
fraud or negligent representation in this context. Prior to the Dodd-Frank 
Act, there were two primary avenues through which a rating agency 
could potentially be found liable for its activities: Section 10 (and Rule 
10b-5) of the Exchange Act and state law claims relating to fraud or 
negligent misrepresentation.261 In addition, Section 11 of the Securities 
Act presented a third conceivable path to liability, but as Securities Act 
Rule 436(g) exempted ratings from the definition of “registration 
statement,” the likelihood of success was remote.262 Plaintiffs bringing 
claims on any of these theories face hurdles none have yet been able to 
overcome, although in one case motions for summary judgment filed by 
the CRAs have been dismissed and the claims are proceeding.263 IRCRA 
offers significant modifications of the law with respect to the first and 
third avenues, at the same time that it does not address the CRAs’ 
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traditional line of defense under the First Amendment, thereby leaving 
its application to structured finance unsettled. 
 
Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act states that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . (a) To employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.264 
In order for a fraud claim to succeed under Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs 
must allege that the defendant 
1) Made misstatements or omissions of material fact; 2) with 
scienter, 3) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; 4) 
upon which the plaintiffs relied; and 5) that the plaintiffs’ reliance 
was the proximate cause of its injury.265 
Furthermore, prior to IRCRA, under Section 21D(b)(2) of the 
Exchange Act, private plaintiffs bringing a case against the CRAs were 
required to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference 
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind” just as any 
other plaintiff subject to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
would be.266 To bring a successful claim against a CRA for securities 
fraud then, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the defendant 
intended to defraud investors by issuing inflated ratings to structured 
finance securities. And in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 
the Supreme Court specified that such an inference of scienter must be 
“more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at 
least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent 
intent.”267 While such a claim is theoretically possible, collecting 
evidence of such a fraud would be very difficult, and absent a “smoking 
gun” such as an email between a rating agency and a client discussing a 
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plan to defraud through the issuance of inflated ratings, it would seem 
difficult, if not impossible, to prove. In any event, there have as of yet 
been no successful claims against the CRAs under either Rule 10b-5 or 
state common law fraud causes of action, while one such common law 
fraud claim has failed.268 
State common law negligent misrepresentation doctrines also 
provide a possible cause of action against the CRAs. While there have 
as of yet been no final judgments on these claims, courts have come to 
different preliminary rulings in the cases filed so far. In In re Merrill 
Lynch Auction Rate Securities Litigation, the Southern District of New 
York dismissed a state law negligent misrepresentation claim on the 
grounds that ratings were opinions, and opinions are not actionable 
under negligent misrepresentation; the court also ruled that common law 
tort claims in the securities context are preempted by the Martin Act in 
New York, citing Abu Dhabi.269 In Anschutz v. Merrill Lynch, on the 
other hand, the Northern District of California allowed a claim of 
negligent misrepresentation to proceed under California law.270 In 
denying the CRAs’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 
F.R.C.P 12(b)(6), the court rejected Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and 
Fitch’s arguments that the state law claim was preempted by CRARA 
and that the First Amendment should shield them from all liability. In 
particular, the Anschutz court distinguished ratings given to structured 
finance securities, which were disseminated to a “limited group of 
investors,” from those concerning matters of “public concern,” which 
deserved the protection of the “actual malice” standard.271 
The third possible claim against the CRAs is far weaker and was 
recently rejected by the Second Circuit in In re Lehman Brothers 
Mortgage-Backed Securities Litigation.272 Securities Act Section 11 
provides for civil liability for untrue statements of material fact 
                                                                                                                                         
 268. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 
171 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that the common law fraud claim fails and that a Rule 
10b-5 analysis should be followed under N.Y. law). 
 269. In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec. Litig., No. 09 Civ. 9888 (LAP), 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14053, at *36 n.6, *39 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011). 
 270. Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 799, 821-22 
(N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 271. Id. at 831 (citing Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 175; see 
also California Pub. Emps’ Ret. Sys. v. Moody’s Corp., No. CGC-09-490241, 2010 BL 
316863, at *8-9 (Cal. Sup. Ct. July 9, 2009) (rejecting First Amendment claims)). 
 272. 650 F.3d 167, 175-85 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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contained in a registration statement, or omissions of such facts, on the 
part of signers of the registration statement, directors or partners of the 
issuer, persons named in the registration statement as becoming a 
director or partner, experts furnishing opinions to be used in the 
registration statement and underwriters.273  There are two obvious 
hurdles to the application of Section 11 to the CRAs. First, the vast bulk 
of CDOs (in the narrow sense in which this term is used in this article) 
were issued under Rule 144A and traded in the OTC markets.274 This 
leaves publicly-traded MBSs as possible targets of a Section 11 claim, 
as they were the class of structured finance securities that had Section 11 
registration statements in order to be publicly traded.275 Second, and 
more importantly, even in the case of registered MBSs, the obvious 
application of Section 11 against the CRAs was (and still is) blocked by 
Rule 436(g) of the Securities Act, which exempts credit ratings from 
being considered part of the registration statement.276 
Because Rule 436(g) blocks plaintiffs from attacking the CRAs as 
experts under Section 11, the third path relies on the argument that the 
active involvement of the CRAs in structuring complex securities makes 
them statutory “underwriters” under the definition provided in Securities 
Act Section 2(a)(11) and attendant case law.277 Section 2(a)(11) 
specifies that “[t]he term ‘underwriter’ means any person who has 
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer 
in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has 
a direct or indirect participation in such undertaking, or participates or 
has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such 
undertaking . . . ”278 While plaintiffs attempted to rely on seemingly 
expansive case law definitions of “underwriter” to support their claims 
in taking an active role in the structuring of securities, they faced the 
basic hurdle that even taking an active role in the structuring process 
that the CRAs allegedly engaged in did not approach the commonly 
                                                                                                                                         
 273. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006). 
 274. See Bethel et al., supra note 78, at 35.   
 275. Id. at 40. 
 276. 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g). 
 277. See In re Lehman Bros., 650 F.3d at 184 n.11 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Perhaps it is 
because [Rule 436(g)], still in effect at the time the plaintiffs brought the instant 
lawsuits, prevented plaintiffs from suing the Rating Agencies under the ‘expert’ prong, 
that they urged new theories of liability under the ‘underwriter’ and ‘control person’ 
provisions.”). 
 278. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11). 
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understood role of the underwriter as one who purchases securities from 
an issuer with a view to resale.279 As a result, the Second Circuit rejected 
the argument that the CRAs were statutory underwriters, as has every 
other court faced with this argument.280 
This brief review illustrates that the federal statutes and regulations 
in place prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, as well as the 
relevant case law, offer significant protection to the CRAs. In addition 
to the uphill battle plaintiffs face under the statutes and case law, the 
First Amendment may provide an additional defense should a plaintiff 
succeed in bringing an otherwise viable claim. In a number of cases 
prior to the credit crisis, the CRAs have successfully argued that the 
“actual malice” standard, which protects journalistic statements 
concerning public figures under the First Amendment, also protects 
issuing credit ratings.281 Since they concern companies of widespread 
interest to investors and others, the argument runs, and because they are 
                                                                                                                                         
 279. The plaintiffs in In re Lehman Bros. used language from SEC v. Kern, 425 
F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting SEC v. Chinese Consul. Benevolent Ass’n., 120 
F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1941)) (stating that the term “underwriter” should be understood 
broadly “to ‘include any person who is ‘engaged in steps necessary to the distribution 
of security issues.’”). Despite the creative attempt to fit the CRAs in the 2(a)(11) 
definition of “underwriter,” the Second Circuit rejected the contention that “any persons 
playing an essential role in a public offering—including the Rating Agencies 
defendants—may be liable as underwriters.” In re Lehman Bros., 650 F.3d at 177. 
Looking at both the language of the statute and case law, the Second Circuit determined 
that underwriters must play some role in “the distribution of securities, either through 
the purchase of securities from an issuer with a view towards distribution, the sale or 
offer of such securities by an issuer, or the underwriting of such undertakings.” Id. at 
180. 
 280. For other cases rejecting the argument that the CRAs should be considered 
Section 11 underwriters, see Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura 
Asset Acceptance Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 776-77 (1st Cir. 2011); In re IndyMac Mortg.-
Backed Sec. Litig., 09 Civ. 4583 (LAK), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63993, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2010); N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., 
PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 254, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Public Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. 
Merrill Lynch & Co., 714 F. Supp. 2d 475, 481-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 281. See Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs, Inc., 499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 
2007), Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 852-
54 (10th Cir. 1999); First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp., 690 F. Supp. 
256 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). In testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee investigating the 
rating agencies in the wake of the Enron scandal, the Fitch’s general counsel, Charles 
Brown, stated that the ratings his agency issues are the “world’s shortest editorial.” See 
REP. OF THE STAFF TO THE S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 96 (Oct. 8, 2002), 
available at hsgac.senate.gov/100702watchdogsreport.pdf. 
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fundamentally opinions and not falsifiable statements of fact, credit 
ratings are protected by the First Amendment. This understanding of 
credit ratings is commensurate with the pre-1970s business model of the 
CRAs, wherein ratings were published in manuals paid for and 
distributed to subscribers.282 The CRAs have claimed that this 
understanding of ratings should also apply to their structured finance 
activities,283 but at least two courts so far have recognized important 
distinctions between ratings of structured finance vehicles and those at 
issue in the earlier cases where ratings activity was protected. First, and 
most importantly, the courts in Abu Dhabi and Anschutz rejected the 
argument that ratings of structured finance securities should be protected 
as “opinions” under First Amendment doctrine because these ratings, 
unlike those of the debt securities of publicly traded corporations, are 
not widely distributed.284 Second, the quantitative nature of the ratings 
process may call into question whether structured finance ratings are so 
indefinite as to qualify as opinions: the Anschutz court stated that 
                                                                                                                                         
 282. In fact, in Jefferson City County School District and First Equity Corporation 
of Florida, the ratings are distributed in a similar fashion. See Jefferson Cnty. School 
Dist., 175 F.3d at 850; First Equity Corp. of Fla., 650 F. Supp. at 256. 
 283. See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE STAFF OUTLINE OF KEY ISSUES 
FOR A LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF CREDIT 
RATING AGENCIES 2 (Prepared by Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP on behalf of Standard 
& Poor’s, a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.) (discussing “the well-
established First Amendment protections of S&P and other rating agencies engaged in 
the business of publishing non-personalized opinions around the world about matters of 
important public concerns, i.e., the creditworthiness of public companies and 
marketable securities.”). 
 284. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 
171, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[W]here a rating agency has disseminated their ratings to a 
select group of investors rather than to the public at large, the rating agency is not 
afforded the same [First Amendment] protection . . . .”) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749, 761-62 (1985) (holding that a credit report 
issued to five parties did not qualify as a matter of public concern)); Anschutz Corp., 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31691, at *82 (For purposes of a summary judgment motion by 
defendants, that plaintiff is not required to meet “the ‘actual malice’ standard for its 
misrepresentation claims” as ratings were only issued to a “select group of QIBs.”); see 
also In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639-40 (S.D. Ohio 2008). 
On the other hand, in rejecting the possibility of a claim of negligent misrepresentation 
made against the CRAs under California law, the Southern District of New York stated 
that since the ratings “were intended for QIBs generally,” they were not made to a 
“‘narrow and circumscribed’” group of individuals as required by a California negligent 
misrepresentation claim. See In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec. Litig., No. 09 Civ. 
9888 (LAP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14053, at *37 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011). 
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“nothing in the record at this stage suggests that the structured ARS 
ratings at issue are, in fact, predictive opinions by their nature ‘too 
indefinite’ to imply a false statement of fact.”285 In sum, the status of the 
First Amendment defense is uncertain as applied to structured finance 
ratings. Cracks have appeared, notably the rejections of motions for 
summary judgment in Abu Dhabi and Anschutz. As Professor Coffee 
notes, the question of whether the First Amendment protects the CRAs 
in this context will only be conclusively settled by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.286 
2. Increased Exposure to Litigation Risk? 
IRCRA makes two changes to the litigation landscape outlined 
above: First, Section 933, “State of Mind in Private Actions,” lowers the 
pleading bar to securities fraud suits against the CRAs and 
simultaneously offers the CRAs a safe harbor from such suits. Second, 
Section 939G nullifies Securities Act Rule 436(g).287 While these two 
provisions each have the potential to bring about important changes in 
the practice of generating credit ratings for structured finance securities, 
at this point neither provision appears to actually increase the litigation 
exposure the CRAs face. This is because in the case of Section 933, the 
safe harbor offered counterbalances any effects on the CRAs of the 
lowered pleading requirements, and in the case of Section 939G, the 
CRAs themselves have acted to prevent its implementation, at least 
temporarily.288 Should Section 939G be implemented, its potential 
consequences are great. 
As discussed above, prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act any 
claim against a rating agency was subject to the heightened pleading 
                                                                                                                                         
 285. Anschutz Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31691, at *80. Again, there is contrary 
precedent on this point: the First Circuit states in Plumbers’ Union that as opinions, 
ratings are not actionable if they are honestly held when formed and later turn out to be 
inaccurate, or if the CRAs could have formed “better” opinions. Plumbers’ Union, 632 
F.3d at 775. Although the First Circuit is discussing federal securities law claims, and 
does not invoke the First Amendment, its discussion is still relevant to the question of 
whether a structured finance rating is fundamentally a factual statement that can be 
right or wrong, or an “opinion.” 
 286. Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 54, at 27. 
 287. Dodd-Frank Act § 939G. 
 288. See infra notes  296-299 and accompanying text. 
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standards of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”).289 
Section 21D of the Exchange Act, enacted by the PSLRA, specifies that, 
for any claim seeking money damages “only on proof that the defendant 
acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to 
each act or omission alleged to violate this title, state with particularity 
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the 
required state of mind.”290 Section 933 of IRCRA, “State of Mind in 
Private Actions,” now carves out an exception to the heightened 
pleading requirement of 21D(b)(2), adding the following provisions 
applicable to CRAs alone: 
(B) Exception.—In the case of an action for money damages brought 
against a credit rating agency or a controlling person under this title, 
it shall be sufficient, for purposes of pleading any required state of 
mind in relation to such action, that the complaint state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the credit 
rating agency knowingly or recklessly failed— 
(i) to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated 
security with respect to the factual elements relied upon by 
its own methodology for evaluating credit risk; or 
(ii) to obtain reasonable verification of such factual 
elements (which verification may be based on a sampling 
technique that does not amount to an audit) from other 
sources that the credit rating agency considered to be 
competent and that were independent of the issuer and the 
underwriter.291 
This new pleading requirement for securities fraud cases against the 
CRAs has a dual effect: on the one hand, the level of scienter a plaintiff 
is required to demonstrate in a Rule 10b-5 complaint against a CRA is 
lowered dramatically. Instead of being required to paint a picture of 
specific intent to defraud, now all a plaintiff must show in a complaint is 
a knowing or reckless failure to examine the creditworthiness of the 
underlying assets in a structured finance security.292 On the other hand, 
by listing two specific failures, either of which is sufficient for a 
                                                                                                                                         
 289. Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.); see supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
 290. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
 291. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2)(B). 
 292. Id. 
740 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
plaintiff to overcome a motion to dismiss, IRCRA offers the CRAs a 
safe harbor against such complaints: by documenting its due diligence 
efforts, such as obtaining a due diligence report from a firm such as 
Clayton Holdings, Inc. or the Bohan Group, Inc., a CRA can avoid 
being drawn into a securities fraud suit. As Professor Coffee notes, this 
provision functions as a safe harbor meant to incentivize more rigorous 
examination of the assets underlying a structured finance security.293 
Section 933 therefore gives with one hand what the other takes away, 
lowering the bar to securities fraud actions against the CRAs while 
simultaneously providing them a valuable safe harbor from such suits. 
The second major change IRCRA institutes with respect to 
litigation exposure is potentially much more far-reaching. Section 939G 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, “Effect of Rule 436(G),” nullifies Rule 436(g) 
of the Securities Act, which states that credit ratings “shall not be 
considered a part of the registration statement prepared or certified by a 
person within the meaning of sections 7 and 11 of the Act.”294 Section 
939G furthers the policy of placing the CRAs on an equal footing with 
other experts in the offering process who function as gatekeepers to the 
capital markets, a policy expressed in Congressional Finding (3) to 
IRCRA, that “the activities of credit ratings are fundamentally 
commercial in character and should be subject to the same standards of 
liability and oversight as apply to auditors, securities analysts, and 
investment bankers.”295 While repeal of 436(g) is not revelant to the vast 
market of private offerings under Rule 144A where private offering 
memoranda are used for disclosure purposes, it does cover all public 
offerings using ratings disclosed in registration statements under the 
Securities Act, such as the publicly-offered MBSs discussed above. As a 
result, the effect of repeal of 436(g) is to expose the CRAs to lawsuits 
under Section 11 of the Securities Act, which subjects issuers, 
underwriters and experts to civil liability for misstatements or omissions 
in registration statements, using a strict liability standard. 
Because of the far-reaching effects of Rule 436(g) nullification, the 
CRAs acted immediately upon passage of the Dodd-Frank Act to 
prevent its implementation. In the days prior to July 21, 2010, when 
President Obama signed the bill into law, the CRAs made it known that 
they would not consent to the inclusion of their ratings in ABS 
                                                                                                                                         
 293. See Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 54, at 27. 
 294. 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g) (2011). 
 295. Dodd-Frank Act § 931(3). 
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registration statements.296 This had the effect of bringing the market for 
publicly-offered ABSs to a standstill because Regulation AB requires 
issuers to disclose the minimum ratings to be assigned to particular 
tranches, as well as the identity of the CRAs that will issue them.297 The 
SEC quickly backed down from a fight when the Ford Motor Company 
temporarily halted a planned issuance on July 20, with the director for 
corporation finance, Meredith Cross, issuing a statement that the SEC 
would not require consents of the CRAs to be included in registration 
statements, as Regulation AB requires.298 The no-action letter dated the 
same day was extended indefinitely on November 23, 2010.299 The 
current stay of the full consequences of 436(g) repeal indicates the 
power the CRAs hold over important sectors of U.S. capital markets, 
and ultimately uncertainty over whether fundamental changes to the 
regulatory structure involving credit ratings can actually be 
implemented. 
The long-term effect of IRCRA’s changes with respect to the 
liability faced by the CRAs is therefore uncertain. Due to the safe harbor 
offered by Section 933300, the CRAs should not expect an increase in 
liability for ratings under securities fraud actions; instead, they will most 
likely carefully document their investigation of the underlying assets 
their ratings are intended to assess, or ensure that the firm with which 
they contract to perform due diligence on the assets does so. Repeal of 
436(g) is a more difficult issue, and presents a significant question for 
financial markets regulators: to what extent should, and can, the 
                                                                                                                                         
 296. See A. Shrivastava, Ford Scuttles Debt Deal as Overhaul Chills Market, WALL 
ST. J., July 21, 2010, at C.1. 
 297. See Regulation AB, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1103(a)(9), 229.1120. 
 298. Statement by SEC Staff: Statement Regarding the Registered Asset-Backed 
Securities Market, by Meredith Cross, July 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch072210mc.htm. The SEC also issued six 
compliance and disclosure interpretations (“CD&Is”) to accompany the no-action letter. 
See generally D. Carbone, The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act’s Credit Rating Agency 
Reform on Public Companies, 24(9) INSIGHTS 19 (Sept. 2010); see also A. Shrivastava, 
SEC Breaks Impasse With Rating Firms, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2010, at C1; A. 
Shrivastava, The SEC Steers Ford Back to ABS Market, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2010, at 
C.7. 
 299. SEC Response of the Office of Chief Counsel Division of Corporation Finance, 
Re: Ford Motor Company LLC, Ford Credit Auto Receivables Two LLC, Incoming 
Letter Dated July 22, 2010, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-
noaction/2010/ford072210-1120.htm. 
 300. Dodd-Frank Act § 933(b) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)). 
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government expose information service providers in the capital markets 
to liability for forecasts of future events? Given the failure of the ratings 
models detailed above in Parts I.C and I.D, it is clear the CRAs were at 
the very least negligent in allowing faulty quantitative models to be used 
by issuers; more likely, they turned a blind eye to signs of manipulation, 
and in some cases even aided their clients in such manipulative ratings 
arbitrage. What is not clear is the degree of danger that exposing the 
CRAs to massive liability for “expert” opinions under Securities Act 
Section 11 poses. Despite the failures of the CRAs, there are strong 
arguments that they provide a valuable service to the capital markets 
that would be impossible or grossly inefficient for even sophisticated 
individual investors to attempt to carry out inhouse.301 
D. IRCRA AS A RESPONSE TO INFORMATIONAL FAILURE 
Part I above argues that the structured finance ratings fiasco was 
primarily a result of flawed ratings models that failed to take into 
account crucial problems with their data and assumptions, and the 
ability of CDO sponsors to arbitrage various differences between types 
of assets, as well as the value of assets in the open market versus their 
value supporting tranched securities. It also argues that it now appears 
the flaws embedded in real estate-backed CDOs were so great that a 
functioning lemons market will not arise, and that these CDOs can 
therefore be understood as “lemons in disguise.” Given this 
understanding of ratings failure, what is the significance of IRCRA? 
Part II.D concludes by considering IRCRA as a response to the failures 
discussed above, and suggesting the larger reasons its authors may have 
pursued an indirect approach. 
1. IRCRA and the Technical Failures of the Ratings Process 
With the passage of IRCRA, Exchange Act 15E is now a complex 
thicket of rules governing the CRAs. While the length and detail of the 
statute is significant, it is important to note that a number of even more 
complicated but arguably useful reform proposals put forward by 
                                                                                                                                         
 301. See, e.g., Coffee, Ratings Reform, supra note 54, at 54 (reminding advocates 
for reform “that credit rating agencies can play a socially useful and economically 
efficient role as informational intermediaries.”). 
2012] INFORMATIONAL FAILURES 743 
IN STRUCTURED FINANCE 
 
commentators have not been adopted by Congress.302 Despite their 
detail, the provisions reviewed above are fairly straightforward and 
should be possible to implement if the SEC is able to provide the 
necessary resources. Most importantly, the new rules do not cross the 
line set forth in CRARA, that the SEC is not to dictate the “substance of 
credit ratings.”303 They instead pursue traditional securities law 
strategies of disclosure and liability, as well as new corporate 
governance mandates a là Sarbanes-Oxley, to prompt the CRAs to 
generate accurate ratings. How then will they remedy the three central 
flaws that generated the ratings failures? Is it likely that IRCRA can 
prevent a repeat of the ratings fiasco?  And what does their response tell 
us about the regulatory strategy of the drafters of the bill? 
The first major source of the flawed ratings was the flawed 
collateral filling the collateral pools of RMBSs and the CDOs holding 
RMBS tranches in turn. IRCRA contains a number of provisions to both 
incentivize the CRAs or their agents to actively assess the 
creditworthiness of the underlying assets. First, as just discussed, the 
CRAs are provided with a due diligence safe harbor regarding claims of 
scienter in securities fraud pleadings if they either “conduct a reasonable 
investigation of the rated security with respect to the factual elements 
relied upon by its own methodology for evaluating credit risk” or 
“obtain reasonable verification of such factual elements” from an 
independent source.304 Documentation of these processes now provides a 
safe harbor from such claims. Secondly, the form required to accompany 
credit ratings under new section 15E(s), “Transparency of credit rating 
                                                                                                                                         
 302. See, e.g., John Crawford, CDO Ratings and Systemic Instability: Causes and 
Cure, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1 (2010) (proposing a ceiling on CDO ratings, either 
through an outright ban on the highest ratings or through linking the rating to the 
weighted average rating of the underlying collateral); Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: 
Explaining Rating Agency Failures in the Build Up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1111 (2009) (suggesting additional liability due to insufficient effect of 
reputational concerns on CRAs); Hunt, supra note 33 (proposing a quality-based 
approach, as opposed to a liability approach, to incentivize accurate ratings, including 
disgorgement of profits for inaccurate ratings); Yair Listoken & Benjamin Taibleson, If 
You Misrate, Then You Lose: Improving Credit Rating Accuracy Through Incentive 
Compensation, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2010) (advocating compensating CRAs in part 
through the debt they rate, with cash flows keyed to the accuracy of the ratings 
assigned). 
 303. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act § 4; 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2). 
 304. Dodd-Frank Act § 933(b). 
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methodologies and information reviewed,”305 requires disclosure of 
information on the quality of data reviewed as well as any limits on 
accessing such data that might affect the uncertainty of the rating, as 
well as whether third party due diligence services were employed, and a 
description of their findings or conclusions. Finally, 15E(s)(4) requires 
ABS issuers to make public “the findings and conclusions” of any third 
party due diligence report, and the due diligence provider must provide a 
written certification that ensures that the firm conducts a “thorough 
review of the data, documentation, and other relevant information 
necessary for a nationally recognized statistical rating organization to 
provide an accurate rating.”306 
While these provisions do not guarantee that flawed collateral will 
not go into CDOs, they should incentivize due diligence on the part of 
the CRAs. Given the benefit of the scienter safe harbor, it is likely firms 
will document carefully their due diligence activities. On the part of 
investors, the disclosure requirements are meant to stimulate demand for 
disclosure of data related to underlying assets. If the experience of the 
past decade is a useful guide, it is less certain that investors will demand 
such information—there was clearly a willingness on the part of 
investors to accept the imprimatur of a credit rating without asking 
further questions.307 Nonetheless, IRCRA attempts to prompt complete 
disclosure by creating investor demand for information concerning due 
diligence on the collateral and increased exposure to litigation risk if this 
is not carried out. 
                                                                                                                                         
 305. Id. § 932(a)(8). 
 306. Id. 
 307. In hindsight it appears that many investors simply relied on the judgment of the 
CRAs when they purchased CDO securities, without doing any due diligence 
themselves or even in some cases understanding the structure of these investments. See 
Mendales, supra note 19, at 1361 (“unregulated ratings for asset-backed securities 
became proxies for the full disclosure required by securities law.”). There also appears 
to have been a significant psychological element in investors’ reliance on ratings. See 
Frank Partnoy, Historical Perspectives on the Financial Crisis: Ivar Kreuger, the 
Credit Rating Agencies, and Two Theories about the Function, and Dysfunction, of 
Markets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 431, 438 (Spring 2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating 
Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH U. L. REV. 211, 222 (2009); see also Erik 
Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to 
Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH U. L. REV. 127 (2009) (on the 
tendency in various areas of financial regulation to rely on complex risk models as a 
contributing factor to the financial crisis). 
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The second key flaw discussed in Part I.D concerns correlation 
data. While this was likely the single most important technical flaw with 
the ratings models, IRCRA attempts to remedy it only through the rubric 
of disclosure: New Section 15E(s) requires that the form accompanying 
each rating include quantitative content relating to “the main 
assumptions and principles used in constructing procedures and 
methodologies, including qualitative methodologies and quantitative 
inputs and assumptions about the correlation of defaults across 
underlying assets”308 and “a statement relating to the extent to which 
data essential to the determination of the credit rating were reliable or 
limited, including . . . any limits on the scope of historical data.”309 Such 
disclosure specifically targets the failings of the correlation figures 
generated by the Gaussian copula formula. 
Unlike its approach to the problem of flawed collateral, which 
incentivizes the CRAs themselves to investigate the underlying assets by 
offering a safe harbor from a heightened threat of litigation if they do so, 
here IRCRA only requires disclosure. At the same time, on the 
understanding of flawed ratings presented in Part I, technical flaws in 
the ratings models are the very germ of the ratings crisis. We will 
discuss below the possible wider significance of IRCRA’s failure to 
address the heart of the problem directly. It is important to note that 
IRCRA preserves CRARA’s injunction that the government may not 
“regulate the substance of credit ratings or the procedures and 
methodologies by which” ratings are generated,310 and there may be 
good reasons for doing so, or at least reasons deeply embedded in the 
fabric of American financial regulation. 
IRCRA’s approach to the third major problem, that the ratings 
models created significant arbitrage opportunities for sponsors, is 
likewise rather mild. The only provision which directly attacks ratings 
arbitrage is Section 938, “Universal Ratings Symbols.”311 In mandating 
that all ratings symbols be applied “in a manner that is consistent for all 
types of securities and money market instruments for which the symbol 
is used,” IRCRA should forestall the most basic type of arbitrage, where 
repackaging of assets alone yields higher value securities because of 
“ratings drift” across different classes of assets. On the other hand, 
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IRCRA does not address the more subtle type of arbitrage, whereby 
assets that the market recognizes as distressed are purchased and then 
used in structured finance vehicles because they carry a credit rating at 
variance with their market price.312 New section 15E(q), “Transparency 
of Ratings Performance,”313 would conceivably capture such activity 
over time, as the performance of ratings eventually should reflect 
arbitrage activity, with sponsors profiting at the expense of investors as 
the assets in CDOs are downgraded or fail to yield the payments 
expected. But there is no direct attack on ratings arbitrage other than the 
requirement that ratings symbols carry with them consistent default 
probabilities.314 
2. The Nature of IRCRA’s Response to Informational Failure 
What sort of response to informational failure does IRCRA offer, 
then? IRCRA approaches only the first of the three central problems 
from the side of both the CRAs and investors; it deals with the second, 
flawed correlation assumptions, through disclosure alone and the third, 
ratings arbitrage, through a mandate that covers only the simple variety 
of the problem. IRCRA’s response to the informational failures 
generated by the quantitative models used to rate complex securities is 
mild and ultimately indirect, offering far more carrot than stick. While 
this may be unsatisfying to the harsher critics of the CRAs, it is arguably 
the proper approach to take. In addition, many critics have focused on 
conflicted behavior on the part of the CRAs and the negative unintended 
consequences of the NRSRO designation, and they should be satisfied 
by the attention IRCRA focuses on these two very real problems.315 It is 
                                                                                                                                         
 312. See supra Part II.C.3, text accompanying note 154.  
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important to emphasize, however, that in focusing on conflicts and the 
NRSRO designation, IRCRA neglects the root cause of ratings failure. 
Why might the drafters have avoided a direct approach to the 
problem of flawed ratings? While an indirect approach might be thought 
to show a lack of determination to deal with a complex but very real 
problem, there are several strong reasons in its favor. First, to directly 
attack hypertechnical quantitative problems through legislation would 
seem to involve mandating the “substance of credit ratings.” A general 
policy behind American securities regulation is to offer as much leeway 
as possible to commercial activity and to police only behaviors that lead 
to fraud, market failure or otherwise create dangerous risks for the 
public.316 Commensurate with this approach is the belief that investors 
bear a large measure of responsibility for the risks they assume, 
particularly those sophisticated investors who purchased the vast bulk of 
complex securities. While the story of the failure of structured finance 
does challenge the policy of caveat emptor even for QIBs and other 
sophisticated parties,317 and the Dodd-Frank Act represents on the whole 
a massive extension of financial regulation, it remains of a piece with 
the general policies of American financial regulation. These policies 
entail the belief that information in the financial markets is most 
effectively provided by private actors, who themselves become key 
financial markets participants. 
A second reason IRCRA fails to deal directly with the causes of 
ratings failure is that complex ratings models are arguably beyond the 
competence of legislators and regulators to govern.318 One of the central 
challenges of regulating the contemporary financial system is its 
intrinsic complexity and the concomitant problem of specialization. Due 
to hypercomplexity, relatively few individuals possess in-depth 
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understanding of its various technical subsystems, and even fewer have 
a solid understanding of how the various interconnected elements of the 
financial system operate as a whole. To expect legislators and even 
career employees of the SEC and other regulatory bodies to understand 
the financial system at the level required to draft comprehensive 
technical legislation and especially regulations to implement that 
legislation may be asking too much in a hypercomplex world. 
Third, even if the proper technical expertise were assembled to 
regulate in this area, there may be a more general psychological reason 
why legislators did not do so: imputing the failure of ratings to flawed 
technical systems is profoundly unsatisfying psychologically, as well as 
incomplete. The picture of ratings failure sketched above is complex: 
technical flaws were the germ of the problem, with opportunistic 
behavior on the part of the sponsors and a conflicted response on the 
part of the CRAs greatly exacerbating it. As a result, the causes of 
ratings failure include both purely mechanical flaws and the intentional 
manipulation of the ratings models. And the entire demand for ratings 
took place within the context of a regulatory system that required 
NRSRO-issued ratings for a broad range of financial activities. In 
addition to the difficulty of understanding how such a complex system 
could lead to such great financial disaster, politicians and the wider 
public most likely have a psychological need to impute the disaster to 
human agency.319 Indeed, a proper understanding of the credit crisis 
identifies villains, even if it is the case here that the villains acted 
opportunistically upon discovering pre-existing flaws in the system, as 
opposed to constructing the entire system out of whole cloth in some 
pre-meditated plot. Nevertheless, the drafters of IRCRA were not 
misguided in targeting conflicts and misguided regulatory incentives. 
The analysis offered here is that the problems IRCRA targets are real, 
and that they greatly exacerbated the effect of the flawed ratings, but 
that IRCRA fails to target the root cause of the problem. 
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CONCLUSION 
The second and third reasons presented here explain and also to a 
large extent justify the regulatory approach taken by the drafters of 
IRCRA. It is not a perfect piece of legislation, but it should help avoid 
such failures in the future. As a concluding observation, the story of 
informational failures in structured finance presents economists, legal 
scholars, business ethicists and others attempting to understand what 
went wrong in this crucial corner of the financial system with an 
intellectual challenge analogous to the one regulators face. A key 
difficulty of understanding the operation of a system as complex as the 
modern financial machinery, both in its successes and failures, is the 
necessity of sorting out the multiple causes that are required to produce 
any one result. This article is an attempt to understand both intentional 
and unintentional causes that operated to produce flawed ratings, and 
explain the response of the U.S. Congress in light of this complex 
disaster. 
 
